China’s military build-up indicates it is serious about taking Taiwan

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China's military build-up indicates it is serious about taking Taiwan

China's military build-up indicates it is serious about taking Taiwan
Expert comment
LToremark
27 March 2025

The more the US dithers in its response, the more the strategic balance shifts in China's favour.



There is a storm brewing across the Taiwan Strait. China has increased its military activity around Taiwan and deployed new landing barges in the South China Sea, while the counter-influence policies of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and shifts in US rhetoric are viewed as provocations by Beijing – fuelling a vicious circle of tensions. 

Beijing has long hoped for the 'peaceful reunification' of Taiwan with mainland China, but has repeatedly stated that it will not renounce the use of force  to achieve unification if necessary. While Beijing's ideal long-term strategy is to pressure Taiwan to unify without the need for conflict, the emerging pattern of its actions suggests that it increasingly believes that forceful intervention could be necessary. 
Perceived provocation by Taiwan and the US
Beijing has made clear that it considers Taiwan a red line in the context of China–US relations – 'the core of China's core interests' . Beijing also set out several conditions under which a red line would be crossed over Taiwan in its 2005 Anti-Secession Law .



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A formal declaration of independence is unlikely – Taiwan is de facto independent and this would bring little material gain. The real risk is that Beijing sees peaceful reunification as no longer possible due to a decisive shift in political sentiment in Taiwan, or if the US takes pre-emptive actions which would make future unification challenging, militarily or politically.

Given the importance Beijing attaches to reunification and how explicit it has been about its red lines, failure to act would be a major blow to China's credibility. It should therefore be assumed that China  is willing to use force if it believes a red line has been crossed. 

From Beijing's perspective, the actions of President Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are moving towards those red lines, if not yet crossing them. While Beijing has long viewed the DPP as separatist, it views Lai with particular hostility  due to his outspoken criticism of China and perceived 'pro-independence' agenda. Lai's efforts to crack down on Chinese infiltration  and influence operations, including his labelling of China as a 'hostile foreign force', has been met with condemnation, warnings and heightened Chinese military activity around the island.

Given the importance Beijing attaches to reunification and how explicit it has been about its red lines, failure to act would be a major blow to China's credibility. 

This is compounded by recent shifts in US language which have similarly angered Beijing. The US State Department removed language  stating that it does not support Taiwanese independence from its website, and a recent G7 statement  omitted the typical iteration of support for a 'one China policy', a diplomatic acknowledgment of Beijing's position that Taiwan is not an independent country. 

These shifts could contribute to a perception in Beijing that the US is moving away from its policy of 'strategic ambiguity' – not committing explicitly to the island's defence in the hope of containing both Chinese aggression and Taiwanese pursuit of formal independence. The apparent lack of consensus  on Taiwan within the Trump administration presents a risk – if Beijing thinks decisive US commitment to Taiwan is on the cards, but not yet explicit, it may perceive a limited window in which it can act before the US adopts a clear policy.
Chinese military preparations
Beijing has long sought the capacity to conquer Taiwan militarily if necessary; the guiding principle of People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization has been to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan involving the United States. 



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China's development of material capabilities such as the new D-Day-style landing barges, and the PLA's focus on interoperability between the navy, air force and rocket force, are part of this modernization – although they do not in themselves indicate that war is imminent.

What is concerning is the frequency and intensity of PLA actions in the context of a shift in Taiwanese political opinion and a US position of ambiguity which is of diminishing strategic value . Perceived provocations by Lai and the US are now routinely met with actions such as exercises, unannounced live fire drills  and undersea cable cutting . 

China is normalizing PLA activity around the island, including joint combat patrols  designed to improve coordination between the different armed services. While this forms part of Beijing's greyzone strategy, their increasing frequency puts pressure on Taiwan to respond, which in turn prompts a stronger Chinese response. In this context, the risk of escalation to actual conflict is heightened.
The role of the US remains the decisive challenge for Beijing
Beijing's preparations indicate that it still takes the possibility of US involvement in a conflict seriously. The new barges expand the range of plausible sites for an amphibious landing, complicating Taiwanese and US defence planning. New cable-cutting technology  would enhance Beijing's ability to cut communications to and from the island. Meanwhile, the trend towards continuous Chinese air and naval activity around the island means the PLA is in a position to rapidly switch from greyzone actions to a genuine blockade or preparations for an invasion. 


Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/chinas-military-build-indicates-it-serious-about-taking-taiwan Mar 27, 2025, 10:19 AM