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#21
General Non-Music Discussion / The Climate Briefing: What ha...
Last post by jon.wallace - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMThe Climate Briefing: What happened at COP29? Chaos, climate finance and coughs
The Climate Briefing: What happened at COP29? Chaos, climate finance and coughs
Audio
jon.wallace
16 April 2025
What do the outcomes of COP29 mean for climate finance and multilateralism?
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/1979179963&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
Chatham House's Environment and Society Centre reassembles to discuss the outcomes of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, what this means for climate finance and multilateralism, and the interconnected challenges developed countries face in balancing global resilience with domestic obligations. More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts .
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/climate-briefing-what-happened-cop29-chaos-climate-finance-and-coughs Apr 16, 2025, 10:38 AM
The Climate Briefing: What happened at COP29? Chaos, climate finance and coughs
Audio
jon.wallace
16 April 2025
What do the outcomes of COP29 mean for climate finance and multilateralism?
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/1979179963&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
Chatham House's Environment and Society Centre reassembles to discuss the outcomes of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, what this means for climate finance and multilateralism, and the interconnected challenges developed countries face in balancing global resilience with domestic obligations. More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts .
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/climate-briefing-what-happened-cop29-chaos-climate-finance-and-coughs Apr 16, 2025, 10:38 AM
#22
General Non-Music Discussion / The US dollar’s role in the i...
Last post by thilton.drupal - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMThe US dollar's role in the international monetary system is now dangerously in flux
The US dollar's role in the international monetary system is now dangerously in flux
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
16 April 2025
The argument that the erosion of the dollar's global status could benefit the US is gaining traction in Washington. That move would be a needless act of self-harm.
Attempts to explain the dollar's declining value in recent weeks will naturally focus on the growing likelihood of a US recession: the prospect of a sharp fall in growth tends to repel rather than attract capital inflows, and currency depreciation is the result. Yet there may be a deeper cause of the dollar's decline, rooted in the view of some within the Trump administration that the reserve currency status of the dollar is more of a burden to the US economy than a blessing. Their remedy is to erode the dollar's status in the international monetary system as part of an effort to weaken it permanently against other currencies, hoping that a more depreciated dollar might reduce the trade deficit and attract manufacturers to the US. That view is very hard to defend. But if the administration really does aim to erode the dollar's status, the international monetary system could enter a form of anarchy it hasn't experienced since President Richard Nixon disconnected the value of the dollar from gold more than 50 years ago.
If the international monetary system cannot rely on the dollar's full convertibility, or its availability in a crisis, it is entering unknown territory.
An abrupt deterioration of the dollar's international status would sharply raise US borrowing costs, while offering China a much easier path to internationalising its own currency.
'Dutch Disease'?
The view that the dollar's reserve-currency status is a problem springs from the idea that its central role in the international monetary system is a form of 'Dutch Disease.' This is the phenomenon in which a country's one big commodity export – natural gas, in the case of the Netherlands during the 1960s – leads to an appreciation of the currency that renders the rest of the economy, and especially its manufacturing sector, uncompetitive. By analogy, some in the Trump administration argue that the dollar's attractions as an international monetary haven have created so much demand for it that the exchange rate has become structurally overvalued and subsequently caused a loss of competitiveness. For them, this is a key factor in explaining why the share of workers involved in US manufacturing has fallen from 24 percent in 1974 to just 8 percent in 2024.
Vice President JD Vance set out a version of this argument when, as a Senator in 2023, he questioned the value of the dollar's reserve currency status by drawing a parallel with Appalachia's
58%
of global foreign exchange reserves were in US dollars at the end of 2024.
It is certainly true that the dollar is currently elevated and is close to being at its strongest level since 1985. But it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with its reserve currency status.
The past 50 years have seen the dollar go through huge swings, sometimes appreciating – as it has during the past decade – and sometimes depreciating, as it did for ten straight years from 2002 onwards. Throughout these cycles, the level of the dollar has changed, without affecting its status to any considerable degree.
Indeed, it is particularly odd for members of the US administration to claim that the dollar's current strength has anything to do with its reserve currency status, since the past decade has, if anything, seen that status diminish slightly, despite the dollar's appreciation.At the end of 2024, the dollar accounted for 58 percent of global foreign exchange reserves, while 10 years earlier that share was 65 percent. Equally, the share of the US Treasury market owned by foreigners has also fallen sharply, from 50 percent in 2014 to around a third today. It's also worth noting that the UK's trade deficit has steadily widened in lockstep with the US during the past few decades. You don't need to have a reserve currency to see a steady, structural deterioration in your trade balance, since that's only really determined by the gap between savings and investment.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/us-dollars-role-international-monetary-system-now-dangerously-flux Apr 16, 2025, 05:50 AM
The US dollar's role in the international monetary system is now dangerously in flux
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
16 April 2025
The argument that the erosion of the dollar's global status could benefit the US is gaining traction in Washington. That move would be a needless act of self-harm.
Attempts to explain the dollar's declining value in recent weeks will naturally focus on the growing likelihood of a US recession: the prospect of a sharp fall in growth tends to repel rather than attract capital inflows, and currency depreciation is the result. Yet there may be a deeper cause of the dollar's decline, rooted in the view of some within the Trump administration that the reserve currency status of the dollar is more of a burden to the US economy than a blessing. Their remedy is to erode the dollar's status in the international monetary system as part of an effort to weaken it permanently against other currencies, hoping that a more depreciated dollar might reduce the trade deficit and attract manufacturers to the US. That view is very hard to defend. But if the administration really does aim to erode the dollar's status, the international monetary system could enter a form of anarchy it hasn't experienced since President Richard Nixon disconnected the value of the dollar from gold more than 50 years ago.
If the international monetary system cannot rely on the dollar's full convertibility, or its availability in a crisis, it is entering unknown territory.
An abrupt deterioration of the dollar's international status would sharply raise US borrowing costs, while offering China a much easier path to internationalising its own currency.
'Dutch Disease'?
The view that the dollar's reserve-currency status is a problem springs from the idea that its central role in the international monetary system is a form of 'Dutch Disease.' This is the phenomenon in which a country's one big commodity export – natural gas, in the case of the Netherlands during the 1960s – leads to an appreciation of the currency that renders the rest of the economy, and especially its manufacturing sector, uncompetitive. By analogy, some in the Trump administration argue that the dollar's attractions as an international monetary haven have created so much demand for it that the exchange rate has become structurally overvalued and subsequently caused a loss of competitiveness. For them, this is a key factor in explaining why the share of workers involved in US manufacturing has fallen from 24 percent in 1974 to just 8 percent in 2024.
Vice President JD Vance set out a version of this argument when, as a Senator in 2023, he questioned the value of the dollar's reserve currency status by drawing a parallel with Appalachia's
He argued that the importance of coal to the regional economy had led to a hollowing out of the region's industry, leaving it less diversified and less dynamic than it might have been.More recently Steve Miran, the chairman of President Trump's Council of Economic Advisers, has argued that the reserve function of the dollar has caused 'persistent currency distortions' that have helped to saddle the US with unsustainable trade deficits, as foreign goods became cheaper relative to those produced domestically.
58%
of global foreign exchange reserves were in US dollars at the end of 2024.
It is certainly true that the dollar is currently elevated and is close to being at its strongest level since 1985. But it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with its reserve currency status.
The past 50 years have seen the dollar go through huge swings, sometimes appreciating – as it has during the past decade – and sometimes depreciating, as it did for ten straight years from 2002 onwards. Throughout these cycles, the level of the dollar has changed, without affecting its status to any considerable degree.
Indeed, it is particularly odd for members of the US administration to claim that the dollar's current strength has anything to do with its reserve currency status, since the past decade has, if anything, seen that status diminish slightly, despite the dollar's appreciation.At the end of 2024, the dollar accounted for 58 percent of global foreign exchange reserves, while 10 years earlier that share was 65 percent. Equally, the share of the US Treasury market owned by foreigners has also fallen sharply, from 50 percent in 2014 to around a third today. It's also worth noting that the UK's trade deficit has steadily widened in lockstep with the US during the past few decades. You don't need to have a reserve currency to see a steady, structural deterioration in your trade balance, since that's only really determined by the gap between savings and investment.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/us-dollars-role-international-monetary-system-now-dangerously-flux Apr 16, 2025, 05:50 AM
#23
General Non-Music Discussion / Independent Thinking: How can...
Last post by john.pollock - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMIndependent Thinking: How can Nigeria tackle corruption?
Independent Thinking: How can Nigeria tackle corruption?
Audio
john.pollock
16 April 2025
Leena Koni Hoffmann joins Bronwen Maddox to discuss Chatham House's decade long research into how Nigerians can fight corruption in Nigeria.
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2079755235&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
In this episode of Independent Thinking, we explore the root causes of corruption in Nigeria, its impact on everyday life, and potential solutions for change.
Bronwen Maddox speaks with Leena Koni Hoffmann about her in-depth report on the issue, as well as insights from speakers at a Chatham House conference focused on Nigeria's ongoing fight against corruption.
About Independent Thinking
Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.
More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/independent-thinking-how-can-nigeria-tackle-corruption Apr 16, 2025, 05:23 AM
Independent Thinking: How can Nigeria tackle corruption?
Audio
john.pollock
16 April 2025
Leena Koni Hoffmann joins Bronwen Maddox to discuss Chatham House's decade long research into how Nigerians can fight corruption in Nigeria.
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2079755235&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
In this episode of Independent Thinking, we explore the root causes of corruption in Nigeria, its impact on everyday life, and potential solutions for change.
Bronwen Maddox speaks with Leena Koni Hoffmann about her in-depth report on the issue, as well as insights from speakers at a Chatham House conference focused on Nigeria's ongoing fight against corruption.
About Independent Thinking
Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.
More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/independent-thinking-how-can-nigeria-tackle-corruption Apr 16, 2025, 05:23 AM
#24
General Non-Music Discussion / In conversation with David Mi...
Last post by Anonymous - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMIn conversation with David Miliband
In conversation with David Miliband
29
April 2025 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM
Anonymous (not verified)
15 April 2025
Chatham House and Online
The world has changed. Aid needs to change too.
The world has changed. Aid needs to change too.
As governments react to tight fiscal environments and weakening political support domestically, international aid has seen cuts in budgets around the world. The Trump administration has rolled back much of USAID, the UK government has reduced the international development budget to 0.3% of GNI to fund defence spending, and other European countries have drastically cut aid programmes. All this at a time when humanitarian need and displacement are on the rise.
Join us at Chatham House as International Rescue Committee's President and CEO, David Miliband, lays out the case for what aid looks like in a changed landscape. He will also discuss how aid spending can be more impactful, particularly in a world with competing geopolitical priorities and small budgets.
Key questions discussed include:
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/conversation-david-miliband Apr 15, 2025, 08:17 AM
In conversation with David Miliband
29
April 2025 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM
Anonymous (not verified)
15 April 2025
Chatham House and Online
The world has changed. Aid needs to change too.
The world has changed. Aid needs to change too.
As governments react to tight fiscal environments and weakening political support domestically, international aid has seen cuts in budgets around the world. The Trump administration has rolled back much of USAID, the UK government has reduced the international development budget to 0.3% of GNI to fund defence spending, and other European countries have drastically cut aid programmes. All this at a time when humanitarian need and displacement are on the rise.
Join us at Chatham House as International Rescue Committee's President and CEO, David Miliband, lays out the case for what aid looks like in a changed landscape. He will also discuss how aid spending can be more impactful, particularly in a world with competing geopolitical priorities and small budgets.
Key questions discussed include:
- How can international aid reclaim its purpose?
- In today's fractured global landscape, where should limited aid be focused?
- With budgets under pressure, how can we ensure what remains of aid delivery has maximum value?
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/conversation-david-miliband Apr 15, 2025, 08:17 AM
#25
General Non-Music Discussion / China’s rare earth export res...
Last post by thilton.drupal - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMChina's rare earth export restrictions threaten Washington's military primacy
China's rare earth export restrictions threaten Washington's military primacy
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
15 April 2025
Beijing's ability to prevent US access to rare earths puts Washington's long-term strategic goals at risk.
The Trump administration's use of tariffs to escalate the trade war with China has captured global attention and pressured Beijing into tit-for-tat measures. But alongside tariffs, Beijing has deployed another economic weapon in its arsenal that could have a more powerful impact: its ability to control the global supply of rare earth minerals.
By restricting access to these critical minerals, China has the potential to do serious damage to the US defence industry and undermine the Trump administration's wider reindustrialization ambitions. Ultimately, this could give Beijing a crucial strategic advantage in long-term US–China competition for military and technological supremacy and add to its existing manufacturing lead.
China's stranglehold on rare earths
Despite President Donald Trump's repeated calls for President Xi Jinping to reach out to secure a deal to de-escalate their trade war, Beijing has pledged to 'fight to the end.' In response to US tariffs, China has imposed restrictions on the exports of seven rare earth minerals, along with other products including permanent magnets.
China produces the vast majority of the world's rare earth minerals, a group of 17 elements that are critically important for modern technology, from magnets to lasers to LCD screens.
Related content
On 'liberation day', President Trump revealed America's strategic vulnerabilities
Beijing controls almost 70 per cent of rare earth extraction and 90 per cent of rare earth processing globally. In contrast, while the US is the second largest producer with the seventh largest reserves, it falls far short of China's output and relies on Beijing for imports. Washington excluded critical minerals from its global reciprocal tariffs, reflecting their importance to US interests.
This gives China a stranglehold over inputs into supply chains that are crucial to American primacy, from semiconductors to aircraft. For example, dysprosium is needed to heat-proof electric motors used in the US Air Force's 'fifth generation' F-35 fighter jets, as well as for applications in robotics, drones, electric vehicles, and touch screens. Another important example is yttrium, which is essential for jet engines, precision lasers, and high-frequency radar. Both are among the seven rare earths restricted by Beijing.
China is leveraging its core role in supply chains from which the US has sought to exclude it – most notably semiconductors. The move sends a message: while the US might attempt to cut China off from the most advanced chips and other cutting-edge technologies, China could go one step further by cutting off the supply chain upstream.
By restricting access to critical minerals, China has the potential to do serious damage to the US defence industry and undermine the Trump administration's wider reindustrialization ambitions.
Chinese exporters of the restricted rare earths have already reported a halt to shipments as they await licenses from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, a system which gives Beijing the ability to regulate the flow of the minerals in the case of a protracted trade war.
In the long term, the US could try to build up its own extraction and processing operations, but this will take time and has a high financial and environmental cost. This would likewise be the case for other countries the US might seek to partner with.
US-China military competition
The restrictions on minerals could undermine the Trump administration's broad ambitions to secure US primacy over China. These include the return of manufacturing to the US through a massive reindustrialisation programme, commitment to global leadership in emerging technologies such as AI, and a strategy to deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan through overwhelming and regionally focused military power backed by a $1 trillion defence budget. Both reindustrialization and leadership in emerging technologies will be essential if the US is to deter China militarily in the coming decades.
Restricted access to China's rare earths put these ambitions at risk. Long-term restrictions could have far-reaching effects on Washington's defence industrial base and the global supply chains of machine tools and chips it relies on, including for AI and other technologies used in advanced military applications.
Even without restricting mineral exports, China already has a decisive advantage in manufacturing capacity.
The US is also at risk of losing the race in competitive areas of defence and emerging technology. In some areas, such as hypersonic missile technology, China is already more advanced. In others, restricted access to minerals could prove crucial.
A key area of competition is over fighter aircraft. President Trump recently unveiled a commitment to develop the F-47, a new 'sixth generation' aircraft with advanced capabilities designed to supersede the US Air Force's existing fighters. Meanwhile, two Chinese advanced prototype aircraft (the J-36 and J-50 ) have been observed on repeated test flights, indicating that China is developing similarly advanced aircraft.
A lack of critical minerals could ensure that China wins the race to deploy a 'sixth generation' fighter, which would be a significant milestone. China would be taking the lead in an area synonymous with US military dominance, one that could prove decisive in the long term.
China's manufacturing lead
A technological lead is important. But in the event of a protracted US–China conflict the ability to sustain an adequate fighting force will be decisive. This is where industrial capacity matters – including sophisticated machine tools required for weapon production that rely on rare earths.
Even without restricting mineral exports, China already has a decisive advantage in manufacturing capacity. Strategists in Washington have voiced concerns about the vast 'ship gap,' with US intelligence estimating that China's shipping production capacity is more than 200 times that of the US.
In a potential war, Beijing could replenish its stockpiles of munitions much faster than Washington. Meanwhile, China's rate of military aircraft production is rapidly catching up with the US. Washington now risks facing a 'fighter jet gap' in which Beijing outproduces it in cutting-edge aircraft. Rare earth restrictions make closing these gaps even more difficult for Washington.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/chinas-rare-earth-export-restrictions-threaten-washingtons-military-primacy Apr 15, 2025, 08:12 AM
China's rare earth export restrictions threaten Washington's military primacy
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
15 April 2025
Beijing's ability to prevent US access to rare earths puts Washington's long-term strategic goals at risk.
The Trump administration's use of tariffs to escalate the trade war with China has captured global attention and pressured Beijing into tit-for-tat measures. But alongside tariffs, Beijing has deployed another economic weapon in its arsenal that could have a more powerful impact: its ability to control the global supply of rare earth minerals.
By restricting access to these critical minerals, China has the potential to do serious damage to the US defence industry and undermine the Trump administration's wider reindustrialization ambitions. Ultimately, this could give Beijing a crucial strategic advantage in long-term US–China competition for military and technological supremacy and add to its existing manufacturing lead.
China's stranglehold on rare earths
Despite President Donald Trump's repeated calls for President Xi Jinping to reach out to secure a deal to de-escalate their trade war, Beijing has pledged to 'fight to the end.' In response to US tariffs, China has imposed restrictions on the exports of seven rare earth minerals, along with other products including permanent magnets.
China produces the vast majority of the world's rare earth minerals, a group of 17 elements that are critically important for modern technology, from magnets to lasers to LCD screens.
Related content
On 'liberation day', President Trump revealed America's strategic vulnerabilities
Beijing controls almost 70 per cent of rare earth extraction and 90 per cent of rare earth processing globally. In contrast, while the US is the second largest producer with the seventh largest reserves, it falls far short of China's output and relies on Beijing for imports. Washington excluded critical minerals from its global reciprocal tariffs, reflecting their importance to US interests.
This gives China a stranglehold over inputs into supply chains that are crucial to American primacy, from semiconductors to aircraft. For example, dysprosium is needed to heat-proof electric motors used in the US Air Force's 'fifth generation' F-35 fighter jets, as well as for applications in robotics, drones, electric vehicles, and touch screens. Another important example is yttrium, which is essential for jet engines, precision lasers, and high-frequency radar. Both are among the seven rare earths restricted by Beijing.
China is leveraging its core role in supply chains from which the US has sought to exclude it – most notably semiconductors. The move sends a message: while the US might attempt to cut China off from the most advanced chips and other cutting-edge technologies, China could go one step further by cutting off the supply chain upstream.
By restricting access to critical minerals, China has the potential to do serious damage to the US defence industry and undermine the Trump administration's wider reindustrialization ambitions.
Chinese exporters of the restricted rare earths have already reported a halt to shipments as they await licenses from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, a system which gives Beijing the ability to regulate the flow of the minerals in the case of a protracted trade war.
In the long term, the US could try to build up its own extraction and processing operations, but this will take time and has a high financial and environmental cost. This would likewise be the case for other countries the US might seek to partner with.
US-China military competition
The restrictions on minerals could undermine the Trump administration's broad ambitions to secure US primacy over China. These include the return of manufacturing to the US through a massive reindustrialisation programme, commitment to global leadership in emerging technologies such as AI, and a strategy to deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan through overwhelming and regionally focused military power backed by a $1 trillion defence budget. Both reindustrialization and leadership in emerging technologies will be essential if the US is to deter China militarily in the coming decades.
Restricted access to China's rare earths put these ambitions at risk. Long-term restrictions could have far-reaching effects on Washington's defence industrial base and the global supply chains of machine tools and chips it relies on, including for AI and other technologies used in advanced military applications.
Even without restricting mineral exports, China already has a decisive advantage in manufacturing capacity.
The US is also at risk of losing the race in competitive areas of defence and emerging technology. In some areas, such as hypersonic missile technology, China is already more advanced. In others, restricted access to minerals could prove crucial.
A key area of competition is over fighter aircraft. President Trump recently unveiled a commitment to develop the F-47, a new 'sixth generation' aircraft with advanced capabilities designed to supersede the US Air Force's existing fighters. Meanwhile, two Chinese advanced prototype aircraft (the J-36 and J-50 ) have been observed on repeated test flights, indicating that China is developing similarly advanced aircraft.
A lack of critical minerals could ensure that China wins the race to deploy a 'sixth generation' fighter, which would be a significant milestone. China would be taking the lead in an area synonymous with US military dominance, one that could prove decisive in the long term.
China's manufacturing lead
A technological lead is important. But in the event of a protracted US–China conflict the ability to sustain an adequate fighting force will be decisive. This is where industrial capacity matters – including sophisticated machine tools required for weapon production that rely on rare earths.
Even without restricting mineral exports, China already has a decisive advantage in manufacturing capacity. Strategists in Washington have voiced concerns about the vast 'ship gap,' with US intelligence estimating that China's shipping production capacity is more than 200 times that of the US.
In a potential war, Beijing could replenish its stockpiles of munitions much faster than Washington. Meanwhile, China's rate of military aircraft production is rapidly catching up with the US. Washington now risks facing a 'fighter jet gap' in which Beijing outproduces it in cutting-edge aircraft. Rare earth restrictions make closing these gaps even more difficult for Washington.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/chinas-rare-earth-export-restrictions-threaten-washingtons-military-primacy Apr 15, 2025, 08:12 AM
#26
General Non-Music Discussion / President Trump’s tariffs inc...
Last post by jon.wallace - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMPresident Trump's tariffs increase pressure on allies to reduce security dependence on the US
President Trump's tariffs increase pressure on allies to reduce security dependence on the US
Expert comment
jon.wallace
15 April 2025
US tariffs add to the sense of an increasingly unpredictable and unreliable partner. Allies in Europe and the Pacific are questioning foundational assumptions about their security arrangements as a result.
Alongside the market turmoil caused by the Trump administration's shifting tariff policy, a parallel set of impacts are emerging in global security. The full effects may only be seen over time, but US tariffs threaten to produce outcomes that run contrary to Washington's security objectives.
President Donald Trump assumes that he can afford to be overly assertive, even cavalier in his policies because other countries simply cannot afford to turn their backs on the US. But his constantly shifting tariff announcements have placed that belief under more stress than ever before. As trade with the US becomes more complex, unpredictable and expensive, some countries – including key US partners – may see additional incentives to rethink the extent of their security dependence on Washington.
The effects on international security are playing out differently among European and Asian allies, two regions that have relied on US security commitments for eight decades. But both are re-examining how committed this US administration is to their needs.
Europe
Europeans were jittery about President Trump's commitment to their security before his election. His administration's policies on NATO and the war in Ukraine increased their concerns. The US pursuit of peace talks with Russia, without European representation, has driven home the desire of the US to disengage from its commitments on the continent as rapidly as possible.
That has forced Europe's leaders to take Trump's 2024 campaign message seriously: it is now widely accepted that European governments must increase their defence budgets and assume the full burden of securing their continent.
European governments are already taking a 'buy European' approach to procurement.
That might be seen as a foreign policy triumph for President Trump: but the tariffs have now added a fresh economic rationale for an approach that decouples some European security dependencies from Washington.
Many European governments have historically sourced weapons systems from the US, benefitting from its cutting-edge technology and economies of scale. But this could now change. Portugal , Canada and other US allies are now reconsidering purchases of the US-built F35 aircraft.
Related content
The EU must enable its defence industry to boost capabilities and reduce dependence on US systems
Tariffs will likely cause the cost of US defence products to rise, if for no other reason that US defence companies will pay more to procure essential components from global markets.
And European governments are already taking a 'buy European ' approach to procurement: a new €150 billion EU rearmament fund could exclude US companies from competing for contracts.
A reduction of defence exports to Europe was certainly not an outcome the Trump administration desired. Neither was the establishment of a European defence industry that might one day compete more effectively with the US on sales to other regions. This would go far beyond Trump's current aim of Europe paying more for its own defence.
However much the US might object to being excluded from European procurement, the recent tariff turbulence can only support the rationale for Europe boosting investment in its own defence industrial base, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine.
Asia and the Pacific
In Asia the impact of tariffs uncertainty will be felt differently. US security partners in Asia and the Pacific are not involved in an active regional armed conflict like Ukraine. And there is no multi-party security pact comparable to NATO whose existence is threatened in the same way by the Trump administration. Instead, a series of individual security relationships exist between the US and Asia-Pacific states.
Related content
North Korea and Russia's dangerous partnership
The Trump administration is also more invested in the region. Whereas confronting Russian forces in Europe is completely off the table for the US, deterring China in the Pacific is a clear strategic priority.
But this will not be sufficient to entirely calm nerves among regional allies. As in Europe, there is increasing belief that the US cannot be relied upon as a security partner in the same way as before.
Asia-Pacific countries are confronted by a deteriorating regional security environment, with China rapidly building up its military while cooperating with Russia and North Korea. And potential conflict flashpoints are clearly identifiable, from Taiwan to the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea. Defence budgets are expanding as a result.
Even major collaborative projects, like Australia's AUKUS nuclear submarine programme, are receiving fresh scrutiny.
Japan, for example, is in the process of massively boosting its historically low levels of defence spending. South Korea is aiming for a 3.6 per cent rise in defence budget in 2025. And Australia's new national defence strategy calls for an uplift in spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP by 2033-34 .
Meanwhile the Trump administration has called on Taiwan to spend 10 per cent of its GDP on defence, a figure Taipei says it cannot afford.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/president-trumps-tariffs-increase-pressure-allies-reduce-security-dependence-us Apr 15, 2025, 04:01 AM
President Trump's tariffs increase pressure on allies to reduce security dependence on the US
Expert comment
jon.wallace
15 April 2025
US tariffs add to the sense of an increasingly unpredictable and unreliable partner. Allies in Europe and the Pacific are questioning foundational assumptions about their security arrangements as a result.
Alongside the market turmoil caused by the Trump administration's shifting tariff policy, a parallel set of impacts are emerging in global security. The full effects may only be seen over time, but US tariffs threaten to produce outcomes that run contrary to Washington's security objectives.
President Donald Trump assumes that he can afford to be overly assertive, even cavalier in his policies because other countries simply cannot afford to turn their backs on the US. But his constantly shifting tariff announcements have placed that belief under more stress than ever before. As trade with the US becomes more complex, unpredictable and expensive, some countries – including key US partners – may see additional incentives to rethink the extent of their security dependence on Washington.
The effects on international security are playing out differently among European and Asian allies, two regions that have relied on US security commitments for eight decades. But both are re-examining how committed this US administration is to their needs.
Europe
Europeans were jittery about President Trump's commitment to their security before his election. His administration's policies on NATO and the war in Ukraine increased their concerns. The US pursuit of peace talks with Russia, without European representation, has driven home the desire of the US to disengage from its commitments on the continent as rapidly as possible.
That has forced Europe's leaders to take Trump's 2024 campaign message seriously: it is now widely accepted that European governments must increase their defence budgets and assume the full burden of securing their continent.
European governments are already taking a 'buy European' approach to procurement.
That might be seen as a foreign policy triumph for President Trump: but the tariffs have now added a fresh economic rationale for an approach that decouples some European security dependencies from Washington.
Many European governments have historically sourced weapons systems from the US, benefitting from its cutting-edge technology and economies of scale. But this could now change. Portugal , Canada and other US allies are now reconsidering purchases of the US-built F35 aircraft.
Related content
The EU must enable its defence industry to boost capabilities and reduce dependence on US systems
Tariffs will likely cause the cost of US defence products to rise, if for no other reason that US defence companies will pay more to procure essential components from global markets.
And European governments are already taking a 'buy European ' approach to procurement: a new €150 billion EU rearmament fund could exclude US companies from competing for contracts.
A reduction of defence exports to Europe was certainly not an outcome the Trump administration desired. Neither was the establishment of a European defence industry that might one day compete more effectively with the US on sales to other regions. This would go far beyond Trump's current aim of Europe paying more for its own defence.
However much the US might object to being excluded from European procurement, the recent tariff turbulence can only support the rationale for Europe boosting investment in its own defence industrial base, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine.
Asia and the Pacific
In Asia the impact of tariffs uncertainty will be felt differently. US security partners in Asia and the Pacific are not involved in an active regional armed conflict like Ukraine. And there is no multi-party security pact comparable to NATO whose existence is threatened in the same way by the Trump administration. Instead, a series of individual security relationships exist between the US and Asia-Pacific states.
Related content
North Korea and Russia's dangerous partnership
The Trump administration is also more invested in the region. Whereas confronting Russian forces in Europe is completely off the table for the US, deterring China in the Pacific is a clear strategic priority.
But this will not be sufficient to entirely calm nerves among regional allies. As in Europe, there is increasing belief that the US cannot be relied upon as a security partner in the same way as before.
Asia-Pacific countries are confronted by a deteriorating regional security environment, with China rapidly building up its military while cooperating with Russia and North Korea. And potential conflict flashpoints are clearly identifiable, from Taiwan to the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea. Defence budgets are expanding as a result.
Even major collaborative projects, like Australia's AUKUS nuclear submarine programme, are receiving fresh scrutiny.
Japan, for example, is in the process of massively boosting its historically low levels of defence spending. South Korea is aiming for a 3.6 per cent rise in defence budget in 2025. And Australia's new national defence strategy calls for an uplift in spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP by 2033-34 .
Meanwhile the Trump administration has called on Taiwan to spend 10 per cent of its GDP on defence, a figure Taipei says it cannot afford.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/president-trumps-tariffs-increase-pressure-allies-reduce-security-dependence-us Apr 15, 2025, 04:01 AM
#27
General Non-Music Discussion / X is taking the Indian govern...
Last post by jon.wallace - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMX is taking the Indian government to court over content moderation tools. Expect India to win.
X is taking the Indian government to court over content moderation tools. Expect India to win.
Expert comment
jon.wallace
11 April 2025
X CEO Elon Musk is close to President Trump at a time when India wants to negotiate on US trade. But X's case challenges wide-ranging government powers.
Last month, social media platform X filed a case in Indian court against the government around a platform called Sahyog, a state-owned digital tool. Sahyog automatically sends government notices to intermediaries like X and Facebook, requesting them to review or remove content. The Indian government says the tool is essential to tackle harmful online content. But X has referred to it as a 'censorship portal ', setting the stage for a legal battle in an Indian court. Foreign and domestic tech firms – as well as freedom of speech activists – will be watching carefully.
In the southern state of Karnataka, X was asked via Sahyog to take down 'hundreds of posts ' which show people dying in a massive crush at a major Hindu religious festival – a request which the platform is now contesting as a threat to freedom of speech. X is taking the Indian government to court to challenge Section 79(3)(b) of the Indian Information Technology Act, 2000, which allows Sahyog to moderate and order the removal of content on social media.
Elon Musk has historically refrained from criticizing the Indian government's powers, arguing in 2023 that American principles cannot apply universally.
Indian legislation grants the government wider-ranging censorship powers than in the UK or EU. Crucially, under Section 69A of the 2021 Information Technology (IT) Act, the government may block content on social media and other media platforms on grounds including 'the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India'.
Discussing that legislation in 2021 , IT and Law Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad said: 'we don't have any issue when anyone criticizes the government of India'. But in 2023 the government was accused of censorship when it used the law to block all social media clips of a BBC documentary critical of prime minister Narendra Modi. The government described the documentary as a 'propaganda piece '.
X CEO Elon Musk has historically refrained from criticizing the Indian government's powers , arguing in 2023 that American principles cannot apply universally . Musk also maintains a seemingly robust relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Given this, and the fact that X is simultaneously attempting to enter the Indian market with his two other companies, Tesla and Starlink, the timing of this lawsuit is particularly interesting. Observers will see the case as a test for the Indian government, which is attempting to marry its significant censorial oversight with a warm approach to tech investment, innovation , and AI governance .
Big tech meets big state
Under former CEO and founder Jack Dorsey, Twitter's relationship with the Indian government was fraught with challenges , though since Musk's takeover as CEO in 2022, this fractious relationship has been somewhat soothed.
In May 2021, Indian antiterrorism police visited Twitter's (as it was then known) Delhi offices after the company marked tweets by an Indian politician as 'manipulated media'. In 2022, Twitter took the government to court over the latter's orders to block certain tweets. The court ruled against the company and fined them approximately £45,000 – a paltry sum, but nevertheless a firm rap on the knuckles.
Companies such as Amazon, Google, and Meta have shown themselves willing to comply with Sahyog
In 2023, former CEO Jack Dorsey accused the Indian government of threatening to shut down the company's offices and asking Twitter to censor journalists – allegations the Indian government denied.
Musk, by contrast, has demonstrated his willingness to work with the Indian government by complying with directives to block clips of the banned BBC documentary on Prime Minister Modi. And, despite some disagreement, X later banned accounts related to the 2021 Indian farmers' protests against the Farm Bills passed by Parliament, claiming it was issued executive orders to do so.
Now, X's pushback against Sahyog will be a lone battle. Companies such as Amazon, Google, and Meta have shown themselves willing to comply with Sahyog and adhere to the IT Act which spawned it.
Though Musk has referred to himself as a 'free speech absolutist ', this case could be interpreted as more of a dispute over control. In an era of greater tech spending and growth, India wants to assert and defend its sovereignty and arguably its control over technology companies. This case will test that control.
The Musk Effect
Musk's position is a difficult one: he will need to make hard decisions on what matters the most to him – namely, his various business interests or his government role – or risk losing battles on both fronts. He seems to recognize the peril, having made no public statement on the Indian case to date.
Related content
Modi's Washington visit highlights India's importance to the US, but will not resolve long-term challenges
Outside India, reports claim X may soon receive major penalties from EU regulators for allegedly breaking the Digital Services Act. That would be seen as significant evidence of the EU's commitment to holding big tech accountable to its regulatory framework – and a setback to Musk's approach to content moderation. Such an enormous legal battle would require far greater firefighting from Musk and once again be complicated by his political and commercial interests.
President Donald Trump has indicated that Musk may shortly be on his way out of government . If this is indeed the case, the Modi administration will have far less to gain by courting him as part of a strategy to maintain bonds with the US.
Nevertheless, the closeness between Musk and President Trump – and the importance of a healthy working relationship between New Delhi and Washington – may lead to a softening of the repercussions on X for bringing this lawsuit.
And the winner is...
Despite the continuing threat of new US tariffs, India's position is relatively secure. There is no reason to think New Delhi will treat X with kid gloves. Instead, the government can be expected to press its case vigorously, utilizing the wide-ranging regulatory powers which have led even typically supportive Indian media to refer to it as 'a wolf in watchdog's clothing '.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/x-taking-indian-government-court-over-content-moderation-tools-expect-india-win Apr 11, 2025, 09:54 AM
X is taking the Indian government to court over content moderation tools. Expect India to win.
Expert comment
jon.wallace
11 April 2025
X CEO Elon Musk is close to President Trump at a time when India wants to negotiate on US trade. But X's case challenges wide-ranging government powers.
Last month, social media platform X filed a case in Indian court against the government around a platform called Sahyog, a state-owned digital tool. Sahyog automatically sends government notices to intermediaries like X and Facebook, requesting them to review or remove content. The Indian government says the tool is essential to tackle harmful online content. But X has referred to it as a 'censorship portal ', setting the stage for a legal battle in an Indian court. Foreign and domestic tech firms – as well as freedom of speech activists – will be watching carefully.
In the southern state of Karnataka, X was asked via Sahyog to take down 'hundreds of posts ' which show people dying in a massive crush at a major Hindu religious festival – a request which the platform is now contesting as a threat to freedom of speech. X is taking the Indian government to court to challenge Section 79(3)(b) of the Indian Information Technology Act, 2000, which allows Sahyog to moderate and order the removal of content on social media.
Elon Musk has historically refrained from criticizing the Indian government's powers, arguing in 2023 that American principles cannot apply universally.
Indian legislation grants the government wider-ranging censorship powers than in the UK or EU. Crucially, under Section 69A of the 2021 Information Technology (IT) Act, the government may block content on social media and other media platforms on grounds including 'the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India'.
Discussing that legislation in 2021 , IT and Law Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad said: 'we don't have any issue when anyone criticizes the government of India'. But in 2023 the government was accused of censorship when it used the law to block all social media clips of a BBC documentary critical of prime minister Narendra Modi. The government described the documentary as a 'propaganda piece '.
X CEO Elon Musk has historically refrained from criticizing the Indian government's powers , arguing in 2023 that American principles cannot apply universally . Musk also maintains a seemingly robust relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Given this, and the fact that X is simultaneously attempting to enter the Indian market with his two other companies, Tesla and Starlink, the timing of this lawsuit is particularly interesting. Observers will see the case as a test for the Indian government, which is attempting to marry its significant censorial oversight with a warm approach to tech investment, innovation , and AI governance .
Big tech meets big state
Under former CEO and founder Jack Dorsey, Twitter's relationship with the Indian government was fraught with challenges , though since Musk's takeover as CEO in 2022, this fractious relationship has been somewhat soothed.
In May 2021, Indian antiterrorism police visited Twitter's (as it was then known) Delhi offices after the company marked tweets by an Indian politician as 'manipulated media'. In 2022, Twitter took the government to court over the latter's orders to block certain tweets. The court ruled against the company and fined them approximately £45,000 – a paltry sum, but nevertheless a firm rap on the knuckles.
Companies such as Amazon, Google, and Meta have shown themselves willing to comply with Sahyog
In 2023, former CEO Jack Dorsey accused the Indian government of threatening to shut down the company's offices and asking Twitter to censor journalists – allegations the Indian government denied.
Musk, by contrast, has demonstrated his willingness to work with the Indian government by complying with directives to block clips of the banned BBC documentary on Prime Minister Modi. And, despite some disagreement, X later banned accounts related to the 2021 Indian farmers' protests against the Farm Bills passed by Parliament, claiming it was issued executive orders to do so.
Now, X's pushback against Sahyog will be a lone battle. Companies such as Amazon, Google, and Meta have shown themselves willing to comply with Sahyog and adhere to the IT Act which spawned it.
Though Musk has referred to himself as a 'free speech absolutist ', this case could be interpreted as more of a dispute over control. In an era of greater tech spending and growth, India wants to assert and defend its sovereignty and arguably its control over technology companies. This case will test that control.
The Musk Effect
Musk's position is a difficult one: he will need to make hard decisions on what matters the most to him – namely, his various business interests or his government role – or risk losing battles on both fronts. He seems to recognize the peril, having made no public statement on the Indian case to date.
Related content
Modi's Washington visit highlights India's importance to the US, but will not resolve long-term challenges
Outside India, reports claim X may soon receive major penalties from EU regulators for allegedly breaking the Digital Services Act. That would be seen as significant evidence of the EU's commitment to holding big tech accountable to its regulatory framework – and a setback to Musk's approach to content moderation. Such an enormous legal battle would require far greater firefighting from Musk and once again be complicated by his political and commercial interests.
President Donald Trump has indicated that Musk may shortly be on his way out of government . If this is indeed the case, the Modi administration will have far less to gain by courting him as part of a strategy to maintain bonds with the US.
Nevertheless, the closeness between Musk and President Trump – and the importance of a healthy working relationship between New Delhi and Washington – may lead to a softening of the repercussions on X for bringing this lawsuit.
And the winner is...
Despite the continuing threat of new US tariffs, India's position is relatively secure. There is no reason to think New Delhi will treat X with kid gloves. Instead, the government can be expected to press its case vigorously, utilizing the wide-ranging regulatory powers which have led even typically supportive Indian media to refer to it as 'a wolf in watchdog's clothing '.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/x-taking-indian-government-court-over-content-moderation-tools-expect-india-win Apr 11, 2025, 09:54 AM
#28
General Non-Music Discussion / Navigating a path beyond regi...
Last post by thilton.drupal - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMNavigating a path beyond regional division is essential for West Africa's security
Navigating a path beyond regional division is essential for West Africa's security
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
11 April 2025
Despite the bitter exit of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and their formation of the rival AES, the destinies of the two blocs remain deeply intertwined.
The split between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES), formalized by the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS in January, represents a major political reconfiguration in West Africa. It threatens to exacerbate instability in the Sahel region, which has already been contending with widespread jihadist violence compounded by localized inter-communal tensions over land and resources.
Under the military juntas that seized power between 2020 and 2023, the three AES countries have abandoned many established structures for cooperation with their neighbours and resolutely turned away from the West in line with what they claim to be a rejection of external interferences and an assertion of sovereignty. They insisted on the departure of French, UN and US troops and aligned themselves with Russia, inviting Russian security contractors in and sending their foreign ministers to visit Moscow for the latest high level talks with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov on 3 April. After forming the AES in 2023, they upgraded the alliance to a formal confederation last July, before announcing a joint military force in January.
The AES's new announcement of tariffs on imports from non-member states includes coastal ECOWAS countries with which they share a long history of economic integration and unimpeded trade, such as Nigeria . The announcement shows that AES leaders continue to prioritize symbolically loaded political gestures ahead of trade, the cost of living and development. After five years of increasingly bitter political confrontation over the military's seizure of power in the Sahelian states, the 12 remaining countries of ECOWAS, previously Africa's most integrated grouping, are now faced with a rival regional bloc.
The fates of the landlocked Sahelian countries and the nations of coastal West Africa remain tightly intertwined, and they face the same array of transnational threats.
The crisis also threatens to have a wider international impact on security. The Sahel witnessed 51 per cent of the world's terrorism-related deaths in 2024. Yet the AES have distanced themselves from longstanding regional security cooperation, at a time when violent extremism, which had already spread from Northern Mali across large tracts of Burkina Faso and western Niger, has continued to reach southwards into the coastal states. Niger has announced its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force combating Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and security conditions have become particularly fragile in parts of Benin and Togo since 2021, with militants able to cross porous borders at will.
Shared challenges
This insecurity overlaps with profound development challenges. The Sahel is highly exposed to the impacts of climate change and continues to experience rapid demographic growth: according to the UN, 42 per cent of the population of West and Central Africa is aged under 15. Natural resources and rural livelihoods are under pressure and deeper poverty could further erode stability by exacerbating existing grievances and driving migration.
Meanwhile, trade relationships across the region have been deeply integrated for decades: the coastal West African states provide the crucial main maritime gateways for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The breakdown of this cooperation can only fuel the social and economic pressures that are a major driver of armed group recruitment.
ECOWAS certainly does not want to abandon its principles on political governance by offering the AES unconditional terms for rejoining.
Fortunately, despite the bitter AES split from ECOWAS, various shared regional mechanisms – covering food security, gas and electricity transfer, and economic and monetary affairs – continue to function as before. Last month, Niger turned to Nigeria for assistance after a crippling fuel shortage, and it remains uncertain how far the AES can afford to further deepen the rift with ECOWAS.
The junta leaders have sought to preserve their citizens' freedom of movement across the region and have chosen so far to remain members of the eight-country West African monetary and economic union (WAEMU), with a common currency, the CFA franc, and central bank, regional financial market, banking regulator and electronic stock exchange.
Security requires cooperation
Although the need to sustain economic growth and livelihoods is a powerful influence upon the Sahel regimes, the prospects for political reintegration into the wider region are remote. However, there is one issue where there may be a mutual openness for cooperation: the struggle to curb violent insecurity, which none of the AES states has managed to significantly reduce.
The AES's vision for security is rooted in enhanced sovereignty, including funnelling natural resource revenues into stronger militaries; but military combat operations have repeatedly failed when limited to national territory – so regional cooperation remains essential. And this is a matter of high importance to ECOWAS too: as the insurgents reach deeper into the northern areas of West Africa's coastal states, their governments have little choice but to explore renewed military collaboration with their Sahelian neighbours.
For now, talk of renewed security cooperation is confined to bilateral relations between individual countries.
AES leaders have accused ECOWAS of providing insufficient support against jihadist violence, particularly when contrasted with the bloc's (eventually unfulfilled) threat to intervene militarily following the 2023 coup in Niger. But security collaboration might nonetheless be the first step towards rebuilding the mutual trust that five years of coups and diplomatic confrontation has shattered.
For now, talk of renewed security cooperation is confined to bilateral relations between individual countries, such as Ghana and Burkina Faso, very much based around the personal diplomacy of leaders such as Ghana's newly elected president, John Mahama. But with security incidents on the northern Mali border refuelling Sahelian distrust of Algeria – whose forces recently took down a Malian drone – offers of security cooperation from individual southern coastal neighbours or even ECOWAS itself could provide reassurance and generate goodwill.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/navigating-path-beyond-regional-division-essential-west-africas-security Apr 11, 2025, 09:21 AM
Navigating a path beyond regional division is essential for West Africa's security
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
11 April 2025
Despite the bitter exit of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and their formation of the rival AES, the destinies of the two blocs remain deeply intertwined.
The split between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES), formalized by the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS in January, represents a major political reconfiguration in West Africa. It threatens to exacerbate instability in the Sahel region, which has already been contending with widespread jihadist violence compounded by localized inter-communal tensions over land and resources.
Under the military juntas that seized power between 2020 and 2023, the three AES countries have abandoned many established structures for cooperation with their neighbours and resolutely turned away from the West in line with what they claim to be a rejection of external interferences and an assertion of sovereignty. They insisted on the departure of French, UN and US troops and aligned themselves with Russia, inviting Russian security contractors in and sending their foreign ministers to visit Moscow for the latest high level talks with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov on 3 April. After forming the AES in 2023, they upgraded the alliance to a formal confederation last July, before announcing a joint military force in January.
The AES's new announcement of tariffs on imports from non-member states includes coastal ECOWAS countries with which they share a long history of economic integration and unimpeded trade, such as Nigeria . The announcement shows that AES leaders continue to prioritize symbolically loaded political gestures ahead of trade, the cost of living and development. After five years of increasingly bitter political confrontation over the military's seizure of power in the Sahelian states, the 12 remaining countries of ECOWAS, previously Africa's most integrated grouping, are now faced with a rival regional bloc.
The fates of the landlocked Sahelian countries and the nations of coastal West Africa remain tightly intertwined, and they face the same array of transnational threats.
The crisis also threatens to have a wider international impact on security. The Sahel witnessed 51 per cent of the world's terrorism-related deaths in 2024. Yet the AES have distanced themselves from longstanding regional security cooperation, at a time when violent extremism, which had already spread from Northern Mali across large tracts of Burkina Faso and western Niger, has continued to reach southwards into the coastal states. Niger has announced its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force combating Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and security conditions have become particularly fragile in parts of Benin and Togo since 2021, with militants able to cross porous borders at will.
Shared challenges
This insecurity overlaps with profound development challenges. The Sahel is highly exposed to the impacts of climate change and continues to experience rapid demographic growth: according to the UN, 42 per cent of the population of West and Central Africa is aged under 15. Natural resources and rural livelihoods are under pressure and deeper poverty could further erode stability by exacerbating existing grievances and driving migration.
Meanwhile, trade relationships across the region have been deeply integrated for decades: the coastal West African states provide the crucial main maritime gateways for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The breakdown of this cooperation can only fuel the social and economic pressures that are a major driver of armed group recruitment.
ECOWAS certainly does not want to abandon its principles on political governance by offering the AES unconditional terms for rejoining.
Fortunately, despite the bitter AES split from ECOWAS, various shared regional mechanisms – covering food security, gas and electricity transfer, and economic and monetary affairs – continue to function as before. Last month, Niger turned to Nigeria for assistance after a crippling fuel shortage, and it remains uncertain how far the AES can afford to further deepen the rift with ECOWAS.
The junta leaders have sought to preserve their citizens' freedom of movement across the region and have chosen so far to remain members of the eight-country West African monetary and economic union (WAEMU), with a common currency, the CFA franc, and central bank, regional financial market, banking regulator and electronic stock exchange.
Security requires cooperation
Although the need to sustain economic growth and livelihoods is a powerful influence upon the Sahel regimes, the prospects for political reintegration into the wider region are remote. However, there is one issue where there may be a mutual openness for cooperation: the struggle to curb violent insecurity, which none of the AES states has managed to significantly reduce.
The AES's vision for security is rooted in enhanced sovereignty, including funnelling natural resource revenues into stronger militaries; but military combat operations have repeatedly failed when limited to national territory – so regional cooperation remains essential. And this is a matter of high importance to ECOWAS too: as the insurgents reach deeper into the northern areas of West Africa's coastal states, their governments have little choice but to explore renewed military collaboration with their Sahelian neighbours.
For now, talk of renewed security cooperation is confined to bilateral relations between individual countries.
AES leaders have accused ECOWAS of providing insufficient support against jihadist violence, particularly when contrasted with the bloc's (eventually unfulfilled) threat to intervene militarily following the 2023 coup in Niger. But security collaboration might nonetheless be the first step towards rebuilding the mutual trust that five years of coups and diplomatic confrontation has shattered.
For now, talk of renewed security cooperation is confined to bilateral relations between individual countries, such as Ghana and Burkina Faso, very much based around the personal diplomacy of leaders such as Ghana's newly elected president, John Mahama. But with security incidents on the northern Mali border refuelling Sahelian distrust of Algeria – whose forces recently took down a Malian drone – offers of security cooperation from individual southern coastal neighbours or even ECOWAS itself could provide reassurance and generate goodwill.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/navigating-path-beyond-regional-division-essential-west-africas-security Apr 11, 2025, 09:21 AM
#29
General Non-Music Discussion / To join or not to join? Norwa...
Last post by LToremark - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMTo join or not to join? Norway is edging closer to the EU
To join or not to join? Norway is edging closer to the EU
Expert comment
LToremark
11 April 2025
Trump's trade war has brought Norway even closer to the EU and increased the urgency for it to make a decision about membership.
Norway is facing a similar challenge to its long-term policy of remaining outside the EU as Finland and Sweden did with their stance on NATO membership three years ago.
Finland and Sweden's foreign and security policies were for decades based on the idea that the Russian threat was manageable. But Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 posed a massive challenge to Finland and Sweden's policy of remaining outside NATO .
Related content
Keeping the peace on NATO's longest border with Russia
From a Finnish and Swedish perspective, the fact that Ukraine was not a NATO member was an important factor. Helsinki especially saw clearly that any self-imposed restrictions for the sake of good relations with Russia would not be respected and thus not guarantee safety.
In the case of Norway, its foreign and security policy has since the end of the Second World War been based on the assumption that its relationship with the US and membership of NATO will guarantee its security. But the example of Norway's neighbour Denmark – both a NATO and EU member – makes it clear that previously close relations with the US do not guarantee future US commitment to any European country's security.
Denmark has been one of the most loyal European allies to the US, fighting alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and sustaining the highest killed in action ratio per capita. But that has not stopped President Trump from issuing repeated threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, by military means if necessary , or Vice President Vance from stating that Denmark 'has not been a good ally '.
Even the closest possible partner is still not a member
Much like Finland and Sweden's NATO policy prior to accession, Norway has chosen the closest possible integration with the EU short of membership. As a result, Norway aligns most of its regulation, trade and foreign policy with the EU, joins EU sanctions, and as an EEA/EFTA member pays into the EU budget for the programmes and agencies it wants to participate in.
But so far Norway does not have a seat at the table where decisions affecting Norway are made – an arrangement which in January 2025 caused Norway's government to collapse over the adoption of the EU's energy rules. At the moment, Norway's government is trying to prevent the country from getting caught in the crossfire of EU–US tariffs.
Related content
Sweden brings benefits for NATO but accession delay raises difficult questions
Just like Finland and Sweden with NATO, Norway is realizing that even the closest possible partnership with the EU is not the same as membership.
Accordingly, support for EU membership has risen considerably in Norway over the past months, reaching 41 per cent in a recent poll . In 2023, the 'yes' side still only accounted for 27 per cent . While the 'no' side still leads with 48 per cent, 63 per cent of respondents were positive towards a new referendum on EU membership – in contrast to the Norwegian political leadership that has ruled out a renewed EU debate . The new government in Iceland, the other non-EU Nordic country, has promised a referendum on EU membership no later than 2027 – a development that Norway is watching closely.
In Finland and Sweden, opinion polls showed that opposition to NATO membership was stable for decades until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine tipped the scales overnight. There too, politicians were behind the curve and had to catch up fast.
Economically, Norway has done well without EU membership, due to its abundant natural resources. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it has become Europe's most important gas supplier and reaped massive windfall profits , bringing the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund to a record 20 trillion NOK in 2024 ($1.8 trillion).
But while the single market is the centrepiece of the EU, it is not the only rationale for joining the union. Norway's neighbour Finland, for example, joined the EU mainly for security reasons to improve its relative position vis-à-vis Russia. Finland was also the only Nordic country to join the Eurozone , to have a seat at the table in a core area of European integration. Today, Ukraine's integration into the EU has become a question of the highest geopolitical importance.
Less US means more EU
As the US considers scaling down its presence in Europe and with its commitment to NATO thrown into question, a new European security architecture is beginning to take shape. Inclusion and exclusion in this new security order, as well as possible grey zones, may no longer be delineated by NATO membership, but rather along the borders of the EU.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/join-or-not-join-norway-edging-closer-eu Apr 11, 2025, 07:49 AM
To join or not to join? Norway is edging closer to the EU
Expert comment
LToremark
11 April 2025
Trump's trade war has brought Norway even closer to the EU and increased the urgency for it to make a decision about membership.
Norway is facing a similar challenge to its long-term policy of remaining outside the EU as Finland and Sweden did with their stance on NATO membership three years ago.
Finland and Sweden's foreign and security policies were for decades based on the idea that the Russian threat was manageable. But Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 posed a massive challenge to Finland and Sweden's policy of remaining outside NATO .
Related content
Keeping the peace on NATO's longest border with Russia
From a Finnish and Swedish perspective, the fact that Ukraine was not a NATO member was an important factor. Helsinki especially saw clearly that any self-imposed restrictions for the sake of good relations with Russia would not be respected and thus not guarantee safety.
In the case of Norway, its foreign and security policy has since the end of the Second World War been based on the assumption that its relationship with the US and membership of NATO will guarantee its security. But the example of Norway's neighbour Denmark – both a NATO and EU member – makes it clear that previously close relations with the US do not guarantee future US commitment to any European country's security.
Denmark has been one of the most loyal European allies to the US, fighting alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and sustaining the highest killed in action ratio per capita. But that has not stopped President Trump from issuing repeated threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, by military means if necessary , or Vice President Vance from stating that Denmark 'has not been a good ally '.
Even the closest possible partner is still not a member
Much like Finland and Sweden's NATO policy prior to accession, Norway has chosen the closest possible integration with the EU short of membership. As a result, Norway aligns most of its regulation, trade and foreign policy with the EU, joins EU sanctions, and as an EEA/EFTA member pays into the EU budget for the programmes and agencies it wants to participate in.
But so far Norway does not have a seat at the table where decisions affecting Norway are made – an arrangement which in January 2025 caused Norway's government to collapse over the adoption of the EU's energy rules. At the moment, Norway's government is trying to prevent the country from getting caught in the crossfire of EU–US tariffs.
Related content
Sweden brings benefits for NATO but accession delay raises difficult questions
Just like Finland and Sweden with NATO, Norway is realizing that even the closest possible partnership with the EU is not the same as membership.
Accordingly, support for EU membership has risen considerably in Norway over the past months, reaching 41 per cent in a recent poll . In 2023, the 'yes' side still only accounted for 27 per cent . While the 'no' side still leads with 48 per cent, 63 per cent of respondents were positive towards a new referendum on EU membership – in contrast to the Norwegian political leadership that has ruled out a renewed EU debate . The new government in Iceland, the other non-EU Nordic country, has promised a referendum on EU membership no later than 2027 – a development that Norway is watching closely.
In Finland and Sweden, opinion polls showed that opposition to NATO membership was stable for decades until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine tipped the scales overnight. There too, politicians were behind the curve and had to catch up fast.
Economically, Norway has done well without EU membership, due to its abundant natural resources. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it has become Europe's most important gas supplier and reaped massive windfall profits , bringing the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund to a record 20 trillion NOK in 2024 ($1.8 trillion).
But while the single market is the centrepiece of the EU, it is not the only rationale for joining the union. Norway's neighbour Finland, for example, joined the EU mainly for security reasons to improve its relative position vis-à-vis Russia. Finland was also the only Nordic country to join the Eurozone , to have a seat at the table in a core area of European integration. Today, Ukraine's integration into the EU has become a question of the highest geopolitical importance.
Less US means more EU
As the US considers scaling down its presence in Europe and with its commitment to NATO thrown into question, a new European security architecture is beginning to take shape. Inclusion and exclusion in this new security order, as well as possible grey zones, may no longer be delineated by NATO membership, but rather along the borders of the EU.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/join-or-not-join-norway-edging-closer-eu Apr 11, 2025, 07:49 AM
#30
General Non-Music Discussion / Independent Thinking: Is the ...
Last post by john.pollock - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMIndependent Thinking: Is the US confronting China in Latin America?
Independent Thinking: Is the US confronting China in Latin America?
Audio
john.pollock
11 April 2025
Yu Jie, Robert Evan Ellis and Bruno Binetti join Chris Sabatini to discuss the battle for influence underway in Latin America between the US and China.
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2076189864&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
This week on Independent Thinking, we explore the growing battle for influence in Latin America between the US and China. In just two decades, China has gone from a minor player in the region to a dominant force – challenging the US.
How is President Trump's government responding and could his policies actually give Beijing more room to expand? Guest host Chris Sabatini is joined by Yu Jie , Robert Evan Ellis , and Bruno Binetti to discuss the shifting power dynamics and what they could mean for the global balance of power.
About Independent Thinking
Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.
More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts , Spotify.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/independent-thinking-us-confronting-china-latin-america Apr 11, 2025, 04:59 AM
Independent Thinking: Is the US confronting China in Latin America?
Audio
john.pollock
11 April 2025
Yu Jie, Robert Evan Ellis and Bruno Binetti join Chris Sabatini to discuss the battle for influence underway in Latin America between the US and China.
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2076189864&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
This week on Independent Thinking, we explore the growing battle for influence in Latin America between the US and China. In just two decades, China has gone from a minor player in the region to a dominant force – challenging the US.
How is President Trump's government responding and could his policies actually give Beijing more room to expand? Guest host Chris Sabatini is joined by Yu Jie , Robert Evan Ellis , and Bruno Binetti to discuss the shifting power dynamics and what they could mean for the global balance of power.
About Independent Thinking
Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.
More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts , Spotify.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/independent-thinking-us-confronting-china-latin-america Apr 11, 2025, 04:59 AM