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#1
General Non-Music Discussion / Zelenskyy and Trump have agre...
Last post by LToremark - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMZelenskyy and Trump have agreed a minerals deal – but it will not stop the war in Ukraine
Zelenskyy and Trump have agreed a minerals deal – but it will not stop the war in Ukraine
Expert comment
LToremark
6 May 2025
For some, helping Ukraine is not worth the possibility of war. But if Russia is allowed to continue unopposed, almost everything is at risk.
Too many column inches have been wasted on inaccurate descriptions of the so-called minerals deal between the US and Ukraine. The deal has been hailed as 'historic', 'momentous', and a 180-degree change in America's stances towards Ukraine – and therefore towards Russia as well.
Not so fast. Many have cheered that there was mention – an admission – of Russia's invasion of Ukraine from the American side, and an apparent commitment to a future Ukraine that is, at least by implication, sovereign and independent.
Related content
Independent Thinking: Ukraine's impossible choice
It is true that we seem to have recovered, somewhat, from the infamous Oval Office meeting in February, between the Ukrainian and American presidents. And the terms appear less blatantly extortionate than the ones thrust upon (and then rejected by) Ukraine in February. In contrast to before, Ukraine will retain ownership over 'subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources' including decisions on what to extract.
But there is less here than meets the eye. We should be clear that there are no security guarantees for Ukraine of any sort – no US presence (beyond a commercial one) to back it up. In fact, this document confirms the cessation of US military aid to Ukraine that America has provided so far, and confirms that from now on, Ukraine will be accruing debt for any US weaponry it may receive. (And it is not guaranteeing that either.)
The benefits for Ukraine – aside from the optics of signing any agreement with the US – are dubious too, and would not come until after the war has ended.
In fact, depending on how you interpret the text, the agreement implies a possible US say in Ukraine holding elections (which the Kremlin wants) through its rather hypocritical insistence on Ukraine upholding democratic values; and a potential say on whether it should join the EU (which the Kremlin does not want). It would be foolish to assume that Trump and his inner circle would not push the Kremlin's requirements on these two issues.
The overall reason not to place faith in the deal is because it is subordinate to the US's ambition to have rapprochement with Russia.
But the overall reason not to place faith in the deal is because it is subordinate to the US's ambition to have rapprochement with Russia . Whether it is out of misplaced economic ambition vis-a-vis Russia or a Cold War mentality of 'great' and peer power carve-ups, the current incarnation of US decision-makers take a 'Russia first' principle.
However, counter-intuitively, the US's attempts to normalize relations with Russia are the main source of optimism. Not because they will work, but because they will not. That might seem perverse. Who would not want better relations between the world's two largest nuclear powers?
For some, Ukraine is not worth it. Not worth the risk of falling into war. That argument might make sense if this were only about Ukraine (though I am not conceding that point). But it is not. If Russia is allowed to continue unopposed – untroubled by Western support, or lack thereof – then almost everything is at risk. It would mean risks to wider European security, global trade (including sanctions relief), fundamental legal principles – perhaps even the fate of Taiwan and the ability to meet climate change goals.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/zelenskyy-and-trump-have-agreed-minerals-deal-it-will-not-stop-war-ukraine May 06, 2025, 09:57 AM
Zelenskyy and Trump have agreed a minerals deal – but it will not stop the war in Ukraine
Expert comment
LToremark
6 May 2025
For some, helping Ukraine is not worth the possibility of war. But if Russia is allowed to continue unopposed, almost everything is at risk.
Too many column inches have been wasted on inaccurate descriptions of the so-called minerals deal between the US and Ukraine. The deal has been hailed as 'historic', 'momentous', and a 180-degree change in America's stances towards Ukraine – and therefore towards Russia as well.
Not so fast. Many have cheered that there was mention – an admission – of Russia's invasion of Ukraine from the American side, and an apparent commitment to a future Ukraine that is, at least by implication, sovereign and independent.
Related content
Independent Thinking: Ukraine's impossible choice
It is true that we seem to have recovered, somewhat, from the infamous Oval Office meeting in February, between the Ukrainian and American presidents. And the terms appear less blatantly extortionate than the ones thrust upon (and then rejected by) Ukraine in February. In contrast to before, Ukraine will retain ownership over 'subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources' including decisions on what to extract.
But there is less here than meets the eye. We should be clear that there are no security guarantees for Ukraine of any sort – no US presence (beyond a commercial one) to back it up. In fact, this document confirms the cessation of US military aid to Ukraine that America has provided so far, and confirms that from now on, Ukraine will be accruing debt for any US weaponry it may receive. (And it is not guaranteeing that either.)
The benefits for Ukraine – aside from the optics of signing any agreement with the US – are dubious too, and would not come until after the war has ended.
In fact, depending on how you interpret the text, the agreement implies a possible US say in Ukraine holding elections (which the Kremlin wants) through its rather hypocritical insistence on Ukraine upholding democratic values; and a potential say on whether it should join the EU (which the Kremlin does not want). It would be foolish to assume that Trump and his inner circle would not push the Kremlin's requirements on these two issues.
The overall reason not to place faith in the deal is because it is subordinate to the US's ambition to have rapprochement with Russia.
But the overall reason not to place faith in the deal is because it is subordinate to the US's ambition to have rapprochement with Russia . Whether it is out of misplaced economic ambition vis-a-vis Russia or a Cold War mentality of 'great' and peer power carve-ups, the current incarnation of US decision-makers take a 'Russia first' principle.
However, counter-intuitively, the US's attempts to normalize relations with Russia are the main source of optimism. Not because they will work, but because they will not. That might seem perverse. Who would not want better relations between the world's two largest nuclear powers?
For some, Ukraine is not worth it. Not worth the risk of falling into war. That argument might make sense if this were only about Ukraine (though I am not conceding that point). But it is not. If Russia is allowed to continue unopposed – untroubled by Western support, or lack thereof – then almost everything is at risk. It would mean risks to wider European security, global trade (including sanctions relief), fundamental legal principles – perhaps even the fate of Taiwan and the ability to meet climate change goals.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/zelenskyy-and-trump-have-agreed-minerals-deal-it-will-not-stop-war-ukraine May 06, 2025, 09:57 AM
#2
General Non-Music Discussion / Bearing the brunt: Asia's res...
Last post by Anonymous - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMBearing the brunt: Asia's response to Trump
Bearing the brunt: Asia's response to Trump
20
May 2025 — 10:45AM TO 11:45AM
Anonymous (not verified)
6 May 2025
Chatham House and Online
How are Asian economies reacting and adapting to Trump's tariffs and a changing geoeconomic order?
How are Asian economies reacting and adapting to Trump's tariffs and a changing geoeconomic order?
Policy makers and global markets have been rocked by U.S. President Donald Trump's trade policies and tariff-driven agenda. America's protectionist stance has hit Asia's export-heavy economies particularly hard. China has engaged in a full trade war with the US. And although the Trump administration has eased some of its approach to trade temporarily, the tariff measures introduced on 'Liberation Day' have shone a light on Asia's role in an integrated global trading system. Governments and business are exploring ways to adjust their trade, supply chains, and diplomatic strategies.
In a rapidly evolving geoeconomic landscape, this session assesses Asia's reaction to the implications of Trump-era trade policies long-term. An increased focus on self-reliance, building up domestic consumer bases and engaging with new international partners; the economies of Asia are at a pivotal juncture. Following decades of development and growth based on a well established trading model, Asian governments are already demonstrating resilience and adaptability amid significant instability in the global trading system.
The discussion will discuss key questions including:
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/open-event/bearing-brunt-asias-response-trump May 06, 2025, 06:22 AM
Bearing the brunt: Asia's response to Trump
20
May 2025 — 10:45AM TO 11:45AM
Anonymous (not verified)
6 May 2025
Chatham House and Online
How are Asian economies reacting and adapting to Trump's tariffs and a changing geoeconomic order?
How are Asian economies reacting and adapting to Trump's tariffs and a changing geoeconomic order?
Policy makers and global markets have been rocked by U.S. President Donald Trump's trade policies and tariff-driven agenda. America's protectionist stance has hit Asia's export-heavy economies particularly hard. China has engaged in a full trade war with the US. And although the Trump administration has eased some of its approach to trade temporarily, the tariff measures introduced on 'Liberation Day' have shone a light on Asia's role in an integrated global trading system. Governments and business are exploring ways to adjust their trade, supply chains, and diplomatic strategies.
In a rapidly evolving geoeconomic landscape, this session assesses Asia's reaction to the implications of Trump-era trade policies long-term. An increased focus on self-reliance, building up domestic consumer bases and engaging with new international partners; the economies of Asia are at a pivotal juncture. Following decades of development and growth based on a well established trading model, Asian governments are already demonstrating resilience and adaptability amid significant instability in the global trading system.
The discussion will discuss key questions including:
- How exactly have Asia economies and businesses been affected by the implementation of President Trump's tariff regime?
- What has been the initial response by policymakers in the region?
- Is Asia about to undergo a 'decoupling' from US markets and how might that take shape?
- What are the new opportunities and markets Asian economies can explore?
- How might relations with Europe change as US tariffs take hold on global trade?
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/open-event/bearing-brunt-asias-response-trump May 06, 2025, 06:22 AM
#3
General Non-Music Discussion / Jordan’s ban on the Muslim Br...
Last post by thilton.drupal - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMJordan's ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is no surprise but comes against a dangerous backdrop
Jordan's ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is no surprise but comes against a dangerous backdrop
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
2 May 2025
The move to undermine the organization's growing appeal has precedent but is risky amid heightened tensions over Gaza and uncertain US policy.
Jordan's Ministry of Interior formally outlawed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood on 23 April, declaring both membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology illegal.
Soon after, security forces raided premises associated with the group, acting in line with the new directive. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices.
While the government's move against the Muslim Brotherhood is primarily a domestic issue and has historical precedent, its decision seems carefully calibrated against a difficult and uncertain international backdrop.
The Muslim Brotherhood had already been formally dissolved by Jordan's Court of Cassation in 2020, though few steps were taken to implement the measure. The government's latest decision is more consequential: it is an effort to dismantle the movement's residual influence in the kingdom and undermine its growing appeal among a population incensed by Israel's war in Gaza.
Alleged plot against the kingdom
The move comes after the government revealed an alleged plot threatening national security, said to have been orchestrated by a group with close links to the Muslim Brotherhood.
In confessions aired on state television, several of the accused claimed that they had been recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood, though the organization denies any involvement. According to government officials, the plot was directed by a cell leader operating out of Lebanon and had involved manufacturing weapons and training militants with the intent of attacking targets in Jordan.
The move seems carefully calibrated and intended to stem rising popular support for the movement as the kingdom navigates a difficult regional backdrop.
The government's decision to clamp down on the Muslim Brotherhood marks another significant, if not wholly unexpected, episode in Jordan's complicated relationship with political Islam. It highlights the kingdom's growing unease with any form of Islamist mobilisation, especially at a time of regional change and uncertainty associated with US policy under President Trump .
It also signals the further tightening of Jordan's political environment. While the decision was motivated by domestic considerations, it will also likely be appreciated by the country's principal Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who have historically viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat.
From loyal opposition to banned group
Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has functioned as a loyal opposition rather than a revolutionary force, eschewing violence and working within political institutions.
In the past, the monarchy has preferred to contain and co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood rather than eradicate it altogether, fearing that radical groups might fill the vacuum. Its deep roots in civil society – through charities, professional associations, and welfare provision – have long made it an indispensable, if sometimes inconvenient, partner.
Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has functioned as a loyal opposition rather than a revolutionary force.
However, the government has previously taken action to limit the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilize political support. This has often coincided with periods of high regional tension that risk exacerbating domestic divisions in the kingdom. For example, the authorities have clamped down on the organization during previous conflicts between Israel and Palestinians or the war in Iraq.
In 2016, authorities shuttered the Brotherhood's headquarters , seized its assets, and transferred its properties to the Muslim Brotherhood Society (MBS) – a government-sanctioned offshoot comprised largely of East Bank Jordanians willing to renounce regional ties and focus solely on domestic issues. While the MBS was tolerated, the Muslim Brotherhood faced exclusion, which culminated in its legal dissolution four years later.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/jordans-ban-muslim-brotherhood-no-surprise-comes-against-dangerous-backdrop May 02, 2025, 10:31 AM
Jordan's ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is no surprise but comes against a dangerous backdrop
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
2 May 2025
The move to undermine the organization's growing appeal has precedent but is risky amid heightened tensions over Gaza and uncertain US policy.
Jordan's Ministry of Interior formally outlawed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood on 23 April, declaring both membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology illegal.
Soon after, security forces raided premises associated with the group, acting in line with the new directive. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices.
While the government's move against the Muslim Brotherhood is primarily a domestic issue and has historical precedent, its decision seems carefully calibrated against a difficult and uncertain international backdrop.
The Muslim Brotherhood had already been formally dissolved by Jordan's Court of Cassation in 2020, though few steps were taken to implement the measure. The government's latest decision is more consequential: it is an effort to dismantle the movement's residual influence in the kingdom and undermine its growing appeal among a population incensed by Israel's war in Gaza.
Alleged plot against the kingdom
The move comes after the government revealed an alleged plot threatening national security, said to have been orchestrated by a group with close links to the Muslim Brotherhood.
In confessions aired on state television, several of the accused claimed that they had been recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood, though the organization denies any involvement. According to government officials, the plot was directed by a cell leader operating out of Lebanon and had involved manufacturing weapons and training militants with the intent of attacking targets in Jordan.
The move seems carefully calibrated and intended to stem rising popular support for the movement as the kingdom navigates a difficult regional backdrop.
The government's decision to clamp down on the Muslim Brotherhood marks another significant, if not wholly unexpected, episode in Jordan's complicated relationship with political Islam. It highlights the kingdom's growing unease with any form of Islamist mobilisation, especially at a time of regional change and uncertainty associated with US policy under President Trump .
It also signals the further tightening of Jordan's political environment. While the decision was motivated by domestic considerations, it will also likely be appreciated by the country's principal Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who have historically viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat.
From loyal opposition to banned group
Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has functioned as a loyal opposition rather than a revolutionary force, eschewing violence and working within political institutions.
In the past, the monarchy has preferred to contain and co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood rather than eradicate it altogether, fearing that radical groups might fill the vacuum. Its deep roots in civil society – through charities, professional associations, and welfare provision – have long made it an indispensable, if sometimes inconvenient, partner.
Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has functioned as a loyal opposition rather than a revolutionary force.
However, the government has previously taken action to limit the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilize political support. This has often coincided with periods of high regional tension that risk exacerbating domestic divisions in the kingdom. For example, the authorities have clamped down on the organization during previous conflicts between Israel and Palestinians or the war in Iraq.
In 2016, authorities shuttered the Brotherhood's headquarters , seized its assets, and transferred its properties to the Muslim Brotherhood Society (MBS) – a government-sanctioned offshoot comprised largely of East Bank Jordanians willing to renounce regional ties and focus solely on domestic issues. While the MBS was tolerated, the Muslim Brotherhood faced exclusion, which culminated in its legal dissolution four years later.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/jordans-ban-muslim-brotherhood-no-surprise-comes-against-dangerous-backdrop May 02, 2025, 10:31 AM
#4
General Non-Music Discussion / Chatham House Primer: How doe...
Last post by Anonymous - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMChatham House Primer: How does Turkey imagine its international future?
Chatham House Primer: How does Turkey imagine its international future?
21
May 2025 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM
Anonymous (not verified)
2 May 2025
Chatham House
Join Chatham House Senior Consulting Fellow Galip Dalay, as he explores how Turkey sees its place in global politics, and what it wants to achieve.
Join Chatham House Senior Consulting Fellow Galip Dalay, as he explores how Turkey sees its place in global politics, and what it wants to achieve.
Turkey represents and spearheads a powerful trend in global politics: regional or middle powers demanding a greater say in their regional affairs, and heightened status in international politics. From the Black Sea, to the Middle East, the Balkans and its footprint across Africa, Turkey pursues an active and ambitious foreign policy. Meanwhile, Ankara maintains close relations with competing global powers. However, questions remain about the long-term sustainability of this policy.
The session will cover:
The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/chatham-house-primer-how-does-turkey-imagine-its-international-future May 02, 2025, 05:02 AM
Chatham House Primer: How does Turkey imagine its international future?
21
May 2025 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM
Anonymous (not verified)
2 May 2025
Chatham House
Join Chatham House Senior Consulting Fellow Galip Dalay, as he explores how Turkey sees its place in global politics, and what it wants to achieve.
Join Chatham House Senior Consulting Fellow Galip Dalay, as he explores how Turkey sees its place in global politics, and what it wants to achieve.
Turkey represents and spearheads a powerful trend in global politics: regional or middle powers demanding a greater say in their regional affairs, and heightened status in international politics. From the Black Sea, to the Middle East, the Balkans and its footprint across Africa, Turkey pursues an active and ambitious foreign policy. Meanwhile, Ankara maintains close relations with competing global powers. However, questions remain about the long-term sustainability of this policy.
The session will cover:
- How does Turkey navigate the global (dis)order?
- What is Ankara's foreign policy ambition?
- How does Turkey's foreign and domestic politics reshape each other?
- What constraints and fragilities does it face in its foreign policy aspirations?
- Where does Turkey's international future lie?
The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/chatham-house-primer-how-does-turkey-imagine-its-international-future May 02, 2025, 05:02 AM
#5
General Non-Music Discussion / The future of the Turkish opp...
Last post by jon.wallace - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMThe future of the Turkish opposition after Imamoglu's arrest
The future of the Turkish opposition after Imamoglu's arrest
Expert comment
jon.wallace
1 May 2025
The implications will depend on how effectively the opposition can channel the energy unleashed by the arrest into political processes and narratives.
On 19 March, Istanbul's mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was taken into custody on charges of corruption and misuse of public office. Two days later, he was arrested. These dates are significant because on 23 March, Turkey's main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), was scheduled to choose its presidential candidate in a primary for upcoming elections in 2028. Imamoglu was the sole candidate. This context has led a wide spectrum of the public to view the arrest as motivated more by the desire to remove a formidable presidential rival than address corruption.
Since Imamoglu's arrest, Turkey has experienced nationwide protests, which are gradually ebbing. The opposition has been morally and politically boosted by these events. And the CHP has political momentum now. However, with three years until the election, maintaining this momentum will be an uphill battle.
Much will depend on how effectively the opposition can channel the energy unleashed by the arrest into political processes and narratives, while navigating this new phase of Turkish politics.
Three issues are of paramount importance here: how to address the presidential candidate question; how to ensure that the CHP and its candidate can appeal beyond their traditional social base; and how to avoid identity politics and focus on governance and policy issues.
The candidate
For a long time, the Turkish opposition suffered from not having a viable candidate to electorally challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The former leaders of the CHP, Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, lacked charisma and personal appeal – though the opposition received nearly 48 per cent of the vote in the second round of the 2023 presidential election, with Kılıçdaroğlu as joint candidate.
The CHP's recent dilemma has been how to manage the presence of multiple potential candidates and avoid intra-opposition rivalries emerging.
However, after the opposition's victories in local elections in 2019 and 2024, the situation changed. The mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas respectively, emerged as popular political figures with nationwide appeal. So too did the the CHP's current chairman Özgür Özel, not least since the arrest of Imamoglu. Rather than a lack of a viable alternatives, the CHP's recent dilemma has been how to manage the presence of multiple potential candidates and avoid intra-opposition rivalries emerging.
That said, Imamoglu has effectively acted as the leader of the opposition, despite not being the chairman of the CHP. Before the arrest, the opposition's choice of presidential candidate seemed settled in his favour. Indeed, the CHP has declared Imamoglu as its presidential candidate following its internal election, despite his imprisonment.
Related content
Independent Thinking: Has Turkey turned against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan?
However, with his arrest and the cancellation of his university certificate – a requirement to be president in Turkey – Imamoglu may be prevented from running. In that event, the question of who will be the CHP's candidate will be back on the table. And efforts to agree a replacement candidate could lead to intra-opposition competition and even fragmentation if not managed well.
At this stage, CHP leader Özel is the more likely replacement. His political performance since the arrest has been strong. Furthermore, at the party's emergency congress held on 6 April, he consolidated his power.
In a sense, if Imamoglu is becoming a leader for the opposition's social base, Özel is emerging as its political leader. Yavas might yet become a candidate, but his chances are slimmer. Nevertheless, given his popularity in opinion polls, his actions could be highly consequential for the opposition's electoral prospects.
Beyond the base
To succeed in the elections, the CHP and its presidential candidate need to appeal beyond the party's traditional voting base. For a long time, the CHP's vote share hovered around 20 to 25 per cent. It struggled to attract votes from social groups such as Kurds and conservatives. For the government, this meant the existence of a boutique opposition incapable of credibly challenging its power.
However, this situation has changed in recent years. The CHP's former chairman Kılıçdaroğlu led efforts to broaden the party's social base focusing on outreach toward the Kurds and conservatives.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/future-turkish-opposition-after-imamoglus-arrest May 01, 2025, 09:47 AM
The future of the Turkish opposition after Imamoglu's arrest
Expert comment
jon.wallace
1 May 2025
The implications will depend on how effectively the opposition can channel the energy unleashed by the arrest into political processes and narratives.
On 19 March, Istanbul's mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was taken into custody on charges of corruption and misuse of public office. Two days later, he was arrested. These dates are significant because on 23 March, Turkey's main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), was scheduled to choose its presidential candidate in a primary for upcoming elections in 2028. Imamoglu was the sole candidate. This context has led a wide spectrum of the public to view the arrest as motivated more by the desire to remove a formidable presidential rival than address corruption.
Since Imamoglu's arrest, Turkey has experienced nationwide protests, which are gradually ebbing. The opposition has been morally and politically boosted by these events. And the CHP has political momentum now. However, with three years until the election, maintaining this momentum will be an uphill battle.
Much will depend on how effectively the opposition can channel the energy unleashed by the arrest into political processes and narratives, while navigating this new phase of Turkish politics.
Three issues are of paramount importance here: how to address the presidential candidate question; how to ensure that the CHP and its candidate can appeal beyond their traditional social base; and how to avoid identity politics and focus on governance and policy issues.
The candidate
For a long time, the Turkish opposition suffered from not having a viable candidate to electorally challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The former leaders of the CHP, Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, lacked charisma and personal appeal – though the opposition received nearly 48 per cent of the vote in the second round of the 2023 presidential election, with Kılıçdaroğlu as joint candidate.
The CHP's recent dilemma has been how to manage the presence of multiple potential candidates and avoid intra-opposition rivalries emerging.
However, after the opposition's victories in local elections in 2019 and 2024, the situation changed. The mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas respectively, emerged as popular political figures with nationwide appeal. So too did the the CHP's current chairman Özgür Özel, not least since the arrest of Imamoglu. Rather than a lack of a viable alternatives, the CHP's recent dilemma has been how to manage the presence of multiple potential candidates and avoid intra-opposition rivalries emerging.
That said, Imamoglu has effectively acted as the leader of the opposition, despite not being the chairman of the CHP. Before the arrest, the opposition's choice of presidential candidate seemed settled in his favour. Indeed, the CHP has declared Imamoglu as its presidential candidate following its internal election, despite his imprisonment.
Related content
Independent Thinking: Has Turkey turned against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan?
However, with his arrest and the cancellation of his university certificate – a requirement to be president in Turkey – Imamoglu may be prevented from running. In that event, the question of who will be the CHP's candidate will be back on the table. And efforts to agree a replacement candidate could lead to intra-opposition competition and even fragmentation if not managed well.
At this stage, CHP leader Özel is the more likely replacement. His political performance since the arrest has been strong. Furthermore, at the party's emergency congress held on 6 April, he consolidated his power.
In a sense, if Imamoglu is becoming a leader for the opposition's social base, Özel is emerging as its political leader. Yavas might yet become a candidate, but his chances are slimmer. Nevertheless, given his popularity in opinion polls, his actions could be highly consequential for the opposition's electoral prospects.
Beyond the base
To succeed in the elections, the CHP and its presidential candidate need to appeal beyond the party's traditional voting base. For a long time, the CHP's vote share hovered around 20 to 25 per cent. It struggled to attract votes from social groups such as Kurds and conservatives. For the government, this meant the existence of a boutique opposition incapable of credibly challenging its power.
However, this situation has changed in recent years. The CHP's former chairman Kılıçdaroğlu led efforts to broaden the party's social base focusing on outreach toward the Kurds and conservatives.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/future-turkish-opposition-after-imamoglus-arrest May 01, 2025, 09:47 AM
#6
General Non-Music Discussion / Independent Thinking: Ukraine...
Last post by john.pollock - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMIndependent Thinking: Ukraine's impossible choice
Independent Thinking: Ukraine's impossible choice
Audio
john.pollock
1 May 2025
Orysia Lutsevych and Matthew Savill discuss the Ukraine–US mineral deal and the challenges facing Ukraine in the peace negotiations with Russia.
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2088777204&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
As President Trump floats a controversial peace deal that could leave Ukraine facing territorial losses and NATO exclusion, Kyiv is forced to weigh an impossible choice between sovereignty and survival.
Bronwen Maddox speaks with Orysia Lutsevych from Chatham House and Matthew Savill from RUSI about battlefield fatigue, shifting alliances and the future of European security.
About Independent Thinking
Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.
More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts , Spotify .
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/independent-thinking-ukraines-impossible-choice May 01, 2025, 09:40 AM
Independent Thinking: Ukraine's impossible choice
Audio
john.pollock
1 May 2025
Orysia Lutsevych and Matthew Savill discuss the Ukraine–US mineral deal and the challenges facing Ukraine in the peace negotiations with Russia.
[soundcloud]https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/2088777204&visual=&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=false&show_user=false&show_reposts=false&color=%23ff5500[/soundcloud]
As President Trump floats a controversial peace deal that could leave Ukraine facing territorial losses and NATO exclusion, Kyiv is forced to weigh an impossible choice between sovereignty and survival.
Bronwen Maddox speaks with Orysia Lutsevych from Chatham House and Matthew Savill from RUSI about battlefield fatigue, shifting alliances and the future of European security.
About Independent Thinking
Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.
More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts , Spotify .
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/independent-thinking-ukraines-impossible-choice May 01, 2025, 09:40 AM
#7
General Non-Music Discussion / A shock to the system: The gl...
Last post by Anonymous - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMA shock to the system: The global implications of Trump II
A shock to the system: The global implications of Trump II
12
May 2025 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM
Anonymous (not verified)
1 May 2025
Chatham House and Online
What have been the implications of the second Trump administration's foreign policy approach?
Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has reasserted an 'America First' foreign policy approach, acting faster and more aggressively than in his first term. His administration has prioritized bilateral transactional diplomacy over collective security arrangements and global governance frameworks, deliberately breaking from post-WWII norms of international engagement and multilateralism. Despite leveraging economic threats and diplomatic pressure, the administration continues to face vexing challenges—a corrosive economic stalemate with China and the continuation of several conflicts—even as it faces eroding support and economic pressure at home.
This session will discuss questions including:
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/research-event/shock-system-global-implications-trump-ii May 01, 2025, 05:12 AM
A shock to the system: The global implications of Trump II
12
May 2025 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM
Anonymous (not verified)
1 May 2025
Chatham House and Online
What have been the implications of the second Trump administration's foreign policy approach?
Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has reasserted an 'America First' foreign policy approach, acting faster and more aggressively than in his first term. His administration has prioritized bilateral transactional diplomacy over collective security arrangements and global governance frameworks, deliberately breaking from post-WWII norms of international engagement and multilateralism. Despite leveraging economic threats and diplomatic pressure, the administration continues to face vexing challenges—a corrosive economic stalemate with China and the continuation of several conflicts—even as it faces eroding support and economic pressure at home.
This session will discuss questions including:
- How should we account for the outcomes of President Trump's foreign policy approach?
- In what ways has President Trump's foreign policy benefitted American interests or undermined American power or strategic objectives?
- What are the implications for the future of multilateral institutions, alliances, and global governance norms?
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/research-event/shock-system-global-implications-trump-ii May 01, 2025, 05:12 AM
#8
General Non-Music Discussion / Merz and Macron can restart E...
Last post by LToremark - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMMerz and Macron can restart Europe's Franco–German engine
Merz and Macron can restart Europe's Franco–German engine
Expert comment
LToremark
30 April 2025
As Friedrich Merz becomes German chancellor, Emmanuel Macron may finally have found the partner he needs for France and Germany to reshape European leadership.
When Friedrich Merz becomes German chancellor on 6 May, the relationship between France and Germany looks set to improve. Despite lingering efforts, France's President Emmanuel Macron and Germany's outgoing chancellor, Olaf Scholz, never had a good relationship and their governments remained at loggerheads on several key strategic issues. Europe's Franco–German engine has been running on empty for too long.
The engine also stalled for domestic reasons. Internal divisions in the outgoing three-party coalition often made it difficult for Germany to clarify its position. In France, the lack of any stable majority in parliament weakened the president's grip. The country changed governments four times in 2024, puzzling its European partners.
Related content
After German election win, can Merz deliver leadership at home and in Europe?
But the situation is changing dramatically. Germany is returning to its familiar 'grand coalition' (CDU/CSU–SPD) government, and the incoming chancellor has already started acting as such. In France, Macron is repositioning himself amid a tumultuous geopolitical context. The two leaders have already started building a dynamic working relationship.
In Paris, there is a reassuring sense of déjà vu in dealing with a German chancellor described as a Rhenish, Francophile Christian-Democrat, who has European integration in his political DNA and intends to invest in EU affairs. Merz's personal long-standing commitment to Franco–German relations facilitates common understanding. Most importantly, he shares many key positions with Paris. In Merz, Macron may well have found the close German partner he has lacked since 2017.
Convergence on key policy issues
On Ukraine, France supports sending long-range missiles to help Ukraine. Merz has spoken in favour of giving Taurus missiles to Kyiv, something that Scholz opposed. Both countries now back NATO membership for Ukraine, also something that Scholz had resisted.
Germany's new 'whatever it takes' stance on defence is welcomed by France.
On defence, Germany's new 'whatever it takes' stance is welcomed by France. Merz has loosened the country's public debt brake to invest in defence and infrastructure. While traditionally a staunch transatlanticist, on the evening of the German elections he called for his country to achieve independence from the US. However, the coalition agreement does not use such gaullist language nor does it push for Germany benefitting from French and British nuclear deterrence, as suggested by Merz earlier with regards to NATO's uncertain future.
On energy, the new chancellor has always considered his country's withdrawal from nuclear power a strategic error. Although reopening reactors would be unrealistic, his opinion could ease a policy deadlock over EU climate targets for 2040 and the financing of new reactors with fresh European means.
But other strategic areas will require compromise.
On trade, Merz endorses the EU's deal with Mercosur, which Paris has stubbornly rejected. But Trump's tariff war and France's isolation on the Mercosur issue could possibly push Paris to slowly soften its opposition.
Related content
Mario Draghi's competitiveness report sets a political test for the EU
On raising European competitiveness, Macron will continue to push for joint borrowing, as recommended by the Draghi report. But Germany's fiscal unleashing at national level may well mean that it opposes such initiatives at EU level.
Nonetheless, it is expected that both governments will push for a Savings and Investment Union, as set out in the Letta report on the future of the single market, and will try to hold joint positions in the negotiations on the 2028-34 EU budget. Both also want to revise EU competition law to foster European industrial champions against foreign competitors.
But closer ties, shared views and a willingness to compromise are not enough to rev up the Franco–German engine, other factors are needed. One driver is that both leaders are in political hurry. Macron's mandate ends in two years, while Merz is impatient to show that Germany is back in Europe. The German coalition agreement proposes a weekly 'EU monitoring' to provide the interministerial coordination needed to clarify Berlin's position in European meetings.
The EU needs political leadership
Current geopolitical circumstances call for European political leadership – and fast. The acceleration of US disengagement from Europe and increasing Russian hybrid threats bring a sense of urgency. The rest of the EU, not least the European Commission, can ill afford its two key member states to lack impetus at such a watershed moment for the fate of European integration.
The EU, not least the European Commission, can ill afford its two key member states to lack impetus at such a watershed moment for the fate of European integration.
Even so, the Franco–German engine can no longer claim to power the whole of the EU. It takes more than two to tango in today's EU of 27. Increasingly, the duo is becoming a trio with Poland, through the revived Weimar Triangle format.
Merz is planning to make his first official visit to Paris the day after he takes office. But he also plans a similarly symbolic visit to Warsaw on that same day to improve the relationship with Poland – Scholz had a terrible relationship with both Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his predecessor – and to underscore the Weimar format as the bedrock of European coordination. France is also planning to enhance its bilateral relationship with Poland through a treaty to be signed on 9 May. These upcoming high-level visits will help build the narrative of renewed European leadership.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/merz-and-macron-can-restart-europes-franco-german-engine Apr 30, 2025, 09:12 AM
Merz and Macron can restart Europe's Franco–German engine
Expert comment
LToremark
30 April 2025
As Friedrich Merz becomes German chancellor, Emmanuel Macron may finally have found the partner he needs for France and Germany to reshape European leadership.
When Friedrich Merz becomes German chancellor on 6 May, the relationship between France and Germany looks set to improve. Despite lingering efforts, France's President Emmanuel Macron and Germany's outgoing chancellor, Olaf Scholz, never had a good relationship and their governments remained at loggerheads on several key strategic issues. Europe's Franco–German engine has been running on empty for too long.
The engine also stalled for domestic reasons. Internal divisions in the outgoing three-party coalition often made it difficult for Germany to clarify its position. In France, the lack of any stable majority in parliament weakened the president's grip. The country changed governments four times in 2024, puzzling its European partners.
Related content
After German election win, can Merz deliver leadership at home and in Europe?
But the situation is changing dramatically. Germany is returning to its familiar 'grand coalition' (CDU/CSU–SPD) government, and the incoming chancellor has already started acting as such. In France, Macron is repositioning himself amid a tumultuous geopolitical context. The two leaders have already started building a dynamic working relationship.
In Paris, there is a reassuring sense of déjà vu in dealing with a German chancellor described as a Rhenish, Francophile Christian-Democrat, who has European integration in his political DNA and intends to invest in EU affairs. Merz's personal long-standing commitment to Franco–German relations facilitates common understanding. Most importantly, he shares many key positions with Paris. In Merz, Macron may well have found the close German partner he has lacked since 2017.
Convergence on key policy issues
On Ukraine, France supports sending long-range missiles to help Ukraine. Merz has spoken in favour of giving Taurus missiles to Kyiv, something that Scholz opposed. Both countries now back NATO membership for Ukraine, also something that Scholz had resisted.
Germany's new 'whatever it takes' stance on defence is welcomed by France.
On defence, Germany's new 'whatever it takes' stance is welcomed by France. Merz has loosened the country's public debt brake to invest in defence and infrastructure. While traditionally a staunch transatlanticist, on the evening of the German elections he called for his country to achieve independence from the US. However, the coalition agreement does not use such gaullist language nor does it push for Germany benefitting from French and British nuclear deterrence, as suggested by Merz earlier with regards to NATO's uncertain future.
On energy, the new chancellor has always considered his country's withdrawal from nuclear power a strategic error. Although reopening reactors would be unrealistic, his opinion could ease a policy deadlock over EU climate targets for 2040 and the financing of new reactors with fresh European means.
But other strategic areas will require compromise.
On trade, Merz endorses the EU's deal with Mercosur, which Paris has stubbornly rejected. But Trump's tariff war and France's isolation on the Mercosur issue could possibly push Paris to slowly soften its opposition.
Related content
Mario Draghi's competitiveness report sets a political test for the EU
On raising European competitiveness, Macron will continue to push for joint borrowing, as recommended by the Draghi report. But Germany's fiscal unleashing at national level may well mean that it opposes such initiatives at EU level.
Nonetheless, it is expected that both governments will push for a Savings and Investment Union, as set out in the Letta report on the future of the single market, and will try to hold joint positions in the negotiations on the 2028-34 EU budget. Both also want to revise EU competition law to foster European industrial champions against foreign competitors.
But closer ties, shared views and a willingness to compromise are not enough to rev up the Franco–German engine, other factors are needed. One driver is that both leaders are in political hurry. Macron's mandate ends in two years, while Merz is impatient to show that Germany is back in Europe. The German coalition agreement proposes a weekly 'EU monitoring' to provide the interministerial coordination needed to clarify Berlin's position in European meetings.
The EU needs political leadership
Current geopolitical circumstances call for European political leadership – and fast. The acceleration of US disengagement from Europe and increasing Russian hybrid threats bring a sense of urgency. The rest of the EU, not least the European Commission, can ill afford its two key member states to lack impetus at such a watershed moment for the fate of European integration.
The EU, not least the European Commission, can ill afford its two key member states to lack impetus at such a watershed moment for the fate of European integration.
Even so, the Franco–German engine can no longer claim to power the whole of the EU. It takes more than two to tango in today's EU of 27. Increasingly, the duo is becoming a trio with Poland, through the revived Weimar Triangle format.
Merz is planning to make his first official visit to Paris the day after he takes office. But he also plans a similarly symbolic visit to Warsaw on that same day to improve the relationship with Poland – Scholz had a terrible relationship with both Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his predecessor – and to underscore the Weimar format as the bedrock of European coordination. France is also planning to enhance its bilateral relationship with Poland through a treaty to be signed on 9 May. These upcoming high-level visits will help build the narrative of renewed European leadership.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/merz-and-macron-can-restart-europes-franco-german-engine Apr 30, 2025, 09:12 AM
#9
General Non-Music Discussion / The UK’s last-minute takeover...
Last post by thilton.drupal - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMThe UK's last-minute takeover of British Steel exposes its reactive approach to economic security
The UK's last-minute takeover of British Steel exposes its reactive approach to economic security
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
30 April 2025
The British government needs a more comprehensive and forward-looking defence-industrial strategy to ensure its national security.
The UK's Parliament recently passed emergency legislation to allow the government to take control of the steelworks at Scunthorpe. This intervention was partly focused on protecting jobs and the local economy, but the underlying rationale was in line with a growing trend among governments to see economic and national security as intertwined.
The decision to intervene was framed in terms of steel's role in the UK's defence industry, infrastructure resilience, and broader sovereign economic capability. Scunthorpe is the last UK site able to produce high-quality virgin steel, which is important for transport infrastructure, military equipment, and other types of defence production.
The UK government, both under Keir Starmer and his predecessors, has taken steps towards incorporating some national security considerations into economic strategy. But the Scunthorpe case highlights some of the limits of the government's current approach.
For the UK government, the intervention in Scunthorpe shows that it sees economic security as critical.
British Steel was taken over by a Chinese company called Jingye in 2020, when it was on the brink of insolvency and shutdown, and Jingye emerged as the only viable buyer.
The imperative of keeping the plant open at the time overrode any concerns about having a Chinese entity control a critical element of national industry, despite different decisions being made for other sectors; the UK banned the Chinese technology company Huawei from parts of the UK's 5G telecommunications network only months later, under US pressure .
But five years on, Jingye said it could not keep the plant operational, claiming it was losing £700,000 per day. Rather than risk its closure, the government stepped in. The intervention fell short of nationalising the plant, which the government says requires significant investment that it would likely prefer the private sector take on. Instead, it passed legislation that gives it special powers over the plant's manufacturing of steel.
The UK's reactive economic security policy
The importance of British Steel meant the government was forced into making a last-minute emergency decision, with few other options to keep the blast furnaces operating.
This kind of piecemeal, reactive approach to deciding which strategic economic sectors require some public intervention or investment is becoming harder to sustain, especially as states increasingly prioritize national security in shaping economic decisions.
Globally, governments are acting to increase their sovereign control or capacity in priority economic sectors, such as energy, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and indeed, steel . They are motivated not just by economic resilience, but the goal of being able to act independently in times of crisis.
In recent years, the UK government has to some degree followed suit, incorporating tools to block foreign ownership or influence in some economic sectors into its national security framework.
The 2021 National Security and Investment Act gave ministers new powers to block foreign takeovers of businesses in sectors deemed sensitive. New approaches to supply chain resilience have also been developed, including the 2022 critical minerals strategy , due to be replaced with a new strategy soon. And the new National Protective Security Authority has developed guidance for research funding or partnerships with overseas institutions, aimed at preventing hostile states from influencing or appropriating sensitive or dual-use research. But these initiatives show the UK's strategy has largely been defensive – often focused on blocking or restricting investment or influence in strategic sectors, with fewer long-term measures for actively building or investing in them.
The government has not articulated a consistent framework for deciding which sectors matter most for national security.
This strategy is starting to look one-sided compared with other states, who have expanded investment or other forms of support for strategic sectors. The US's vast investment in its domestic chip industry and other green technologies under President Biden is one striking example. But countries with more comparable economies to the UK, such as Australia, have also set out plans for limited industrial policies and state support to crowd investment into industries deemed strategic.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/uks-last-minute-takeover-british-steel-exposes-its-reactive-approach-economic-security Apr 30, 2025, 06:38 AM
The UK's last-minute takeover of British Steel exposes its reactive approach to economic security
Expert comment
thilton.drupal
30 April 2025
The British government needs a more comprehensive and forward-looking defence-industrial strategy to ensure its national security.
The UK's Parliament recently passed emergency legislation to allow the government to take control of the steelworks at Scunthorpe. This intervention was partly focused on protecting jobs and the local economy, but the underlying rationale was in line with a growing trend among governments to see economic and national security as intertwined.
The decision to intervene was framed in terms of steel's role in the UK's defence industry, infrastructure resilience, and broader sovereign economic capability. Scunthorpe is the last UK site able to produce high-quality virgin steel, which is important for transport infrastructure, military equipment, and other types of defence production.
The UK government, both under Keir Starmer and his predecessors, has taken steps towards incorporating some national security considerations into economic strategy. But the Scunthorpe case highlights some of the limits of the government's current approach.
For the UK government, the intervention in Scunthorpe shows that it sees economic security as critical.
British Steel was taken over by a Chinese company called Jingye in 2020, when it was on the brink of insolvency and shutdown, and Jingye emerged as the only viable buyer.
The imperative of keeping the plant open at the time overrode any concerns about having a Chinese entity control a critical element of national industry, despite different decisions being made for other sectors; the UK banned the Chinese technology company Huawei from parts of the UK's 5G telecommunications network only months later, under US pressure .
But five years on, Jingye said it could not keep the plant operational, claiming it was losing £700,000 per day. Rather than risk its closure, the government stepped in. The intervention fell short of nationalising the plant, which the government says requires significant investment that it would likely prefer the private sector take on. Instead, it passed legislation that gives it special powers over the plant's manufacturing of steel.
The UK's reactive economic security policy
The importance of British Steel meant the government was forced into making a last-minute emergency decision, with few other options to keep the blast furnaces operating.
This kind of piecemeal, reactive approach to deciding which strategic economic sectors require some public intervention or investment is becoming harder to sustain, especially as states increasingly prioritize national security in shaping economic decisions.
Globally, governments are acting to increase their sovereign control or capacity in priority economic sectors, such as energy, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and indeed, steel . They are motivated not just by economic resilience, but the goal of being able to act independently in times of crisis.
In recent years, the UK government has to some degree followed suit, incorporating tools to block foreign ownership or influence in some economic sectors into its national security framework.
The 2021 National Security and Investment Act gave ministers new powers to block foreign takeovers of businesses in sectors deemed sensitive. New approaches to supply chain resilience have also been developed, including the 2022 critical minerals strategy , due to be replaced with a new strategy soon. And the new National Protective Security Authority has developed guidance for research funding or partnerships with overseas institutions, aimed at preventing hostile states from influencing or appropriating sensitive or dual-use research. But these initiatives show the UK's strategy has largely been defensive – often focused on blocking or restricting investment or influence in strategic sectors, with fewer long-term measures for actively building or investing in them.
The government has not articulated a consistent framework for deciding which sectors matter most for national security.
This strategy is starting to look one-sided compared with other states, who have expanded investment or other forms of support for strategic sectors. The US's vast investment in its domestic chip industry and other green technologies under President Biden is one striking example. But countries with more comparable economies to the UK, such as Australia, have also set out plans for limited industrial policies and state support to crowd investment into industries deemed strategic.
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/uks-last-minute-takeover-british-steel-exposes-its-reactive-approach-economic-security Apr 30, 2025, 06:38 AM
#10
General Non-Music Discussion / How are states responding to ...
Last post by Anonymous - May 07, 2025, 01:48 AMHow are states responding to a changing world order?
How are states responding to a changing world order?
27
May 2025 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM
Anonymous (not verified)
29 April 2025
Chatham House and Online
Experts discuss the possible alternatives to a US-centric world and how states seek to shape the future international order.
Experts discuss the possible alternatives to a US-centric world and how states seek to shape the future international order.
The liberal international order, dominant since 1945, is facing unprecedented challenges driven by both enduring and emerging forces. Key among these are the rise of China, Russia's war of aggression, the surge of populism within liberal democracies and the need to maintain credibility amongst Global South nations in response to claims of double standards and western hypocrisy.
Following the publication of the research paper, Competing Visions for International Order , experts will examine how the US and its allies and adversaries are recalibrating their foreign policies in response to these dynamics - whether by adapting to, disrupting, or rejecting the existing order.
By registering for this event, attendees agree to our Code of Conduct , ensuring a respectful, inclusive, and welcoming space for diverse perspectives and debate
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/open-event/how-are-states-responding-changing-world-order Apr 29, 2025, 10:52 AM
How are states responding to a changing world order?
27
May 2025 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM
Anonymous (not verified)
29 April 2025
Chatham House and Online
Experts discuss the possible alternatives to a US-centric world and how states seek to shape the future international order.
Experts discuss the possible alternatives to a US-centric world and how states seek to shape the future international order.
The liberal international order, dominant since 1945, is facing unprecedented challenges driven by both enduring and emerging forces. Key among these are the rise of China, Russia's war of aggression, the surge of populism within liberal democracies and the need to maintain credibility amongst Global South nations in response to claims of double standards and western hypocrisy.
Following the publication of the research paper, Competing Visions for International Order , experts will examine how the US and its allies and adversaries are recalibrating their foreign policies in response to these dynamics - whether by adapting to, disrupting, or rejecting the existing order.
By registering for this event, attendees agree to our Code of Conduct , ensuring a respectful, inclusive, and welcoming space for diverse perspectives and debate
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/open-event/how-are-states-responding-changing-world-order Apr 29, 2025, 10:52 AM